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ABSTRACT
Few historians have focused on the critical importance o f wartime Reconstruction and
federal policy toward "contrabands," slaves who took advantage o f wartime chaos and
escaped into Northern territory and the lines of the Union army. Indeed, the overarching
successes and failures of postbellum Reconstruction often found their origins in the
innumerable contraband camps where blacks, army officials, and missionary associations
struggled to define the uncertain limits of "freedom."
The scholars that have looked at contraband settlements have given surprisingly little
attention to contraband camps in Virginia, especially Freedmen’s Village, a "model"
settlement that drew unique publicity because o f its proximity to Washington and its
location on the famous and picturesque estate of Robert E. Lee. Overall, this essay seeks
to evaluate one o f America's most famous contraband settlements. Can Freedmen's
Village be more precisely classified as an experiment in free labor and independence, or
as a restrictive camp that foreshadowed the tragic failings o f postbellum Reconstruction?
. Or does Freedmen's Village defy simple categorization?
In general, government officials and Southern planters rejected the Village
freedpeople’s version of freedom. Despite Republican pronouncements to the contrary,
this essay will argue that Republican theories of free labor were never implemented at
Freedmen's Village; workers were rarely paid and often beaten by Village "overseers,"
while rampant impressment and brutal work schedules prevented freedpeople from
controlling their time or labor. The federal government's concerns with organizing a
potentially troublesome and burdensome population and feeding the hungry Union army
took precedence over introducing freedpeople to a true "free labor" economy.
Historians o f wartime and post-war Reconstruction have likewise neglected Virginia's
Eastern Shore, a fascinating region that officially rejected secession yet held fast to
traditional Southern values of racism and slavery. When the Shore's most ardent
secessionists fled to the Confederate mainland, they left a population o f landless
freedpeople in the hands o f the Union army and federal government. Thus, the Eastern
Shore provided an interesting testing ground for wartime Reconstruction policy within a
nominally Unionist region.
Ironically, the Shore's Unionist stance ultimately worked against the freedpeople of
Accomac and Northampton counties; while army and government officials confiscated
Confederate land and constructed contraband farming enterprises throughout the disloyal
South, officials on the Shore hesitated to take similar steps that would inevitably have
alienated loyal Shore planters. As a result, federal officials immediately adopted a
brutally efficient contract labor system. Freedpeople who desperately sought land
ownership and financial independence were instead contractually hired out to local
planters under blatantly unfair terms.
The stories of these two communities foreshadowed the larger failures o f postbellum
Reconstruction. Conservative military and Bureau officials motivated by self-interest
and open racism shunned radical “free labor ideology” and effectively allied with
Virginia planters to ensure that freedpeople would remain in positions of economic
dependency.

MEANINGS OF FREEDOM
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Introduction
"De Lord has heard the groans o f de people, and has come down to deliver! You all
knows in Dixie you worked de day long, an' never got no satifacshun. But, new, what
you make is yourn!"1
—Virginia slave George Payne on December 31, 1862, one day before the Emancipation Proclamation
was to take effect.
"Mr. President. It is my desire to be free. You will please let me know i f we are free. And what I can
do. I write you fo r advice. Please send me word this week, or as soon as possible
-Maryland slave to Abraham Lincoln, August 1864

Eric Foner's seminal work, Reconstruction: America's

U p finished

Revolution

1863-1877 (1988), synthesized and added to a generation of scholarship that
represented Reconstruction as a time o f hope and unprecedented opportunity, an era
marked by black political activism and community development. Foner also tipped
the scales toward those scholars who saw the Radical Republicans as having been
genuinely devoted to black political and civil equality and literally radical rather than
viscerally conservative in their political outlook. Reconstruction historians also agree,
however, that these radical goals and advances were ultimately undermined by a
variety o f forces that combined to place Southern blacks in a position of economic
dependence and political impotence. These forces include the rise o f Southern
Democrats united by a program and rhetoric of white supremacy, savagely effective
violence directed against black voters and community institutions, and the growing
reluctance of conservative, business-minded Northern Republicans to interfere in
Southern affairs when national economic problems seemed more urgent.

3

Few historians have focused on the critical importance of wartime
Reconstruction and federal policy toward "contrabands," slaves who courageously
took advantage o f wartime chaos and escaped into Northern territory and the lines of
the Union army. Indeed, the overarching successes and failures o f postbellum
Reconstruction often found their origins in the innumerable contraband camps where
blacks, army officials, and missionary associations struggled to define the uncertain
limits of "freedom." Not surprisingly, the few historians who have closely studied the
bewildering array o f Union contraband camps have been unable to reach an
interpretive consensus on the nature of the "freedom" that was constantly negotiated
and renegotiated by freedpeople and their white caretakers.
In From Contraband to Freedman, Louis Gerteis looks at contraband camps
in nearly every region o f the nation and arrives at the decidedly pessimistic
conclusion that contraband policy was defined by "the failure o f the government to
protect blacks as free laborers," a disastrous shortcoming that "shaped postwar
policies toward the freedman and in large measure precluded the possibility o f radical
social transformation."4 Numerous localized monographs support Gerteis's general
argument; C. Peter Ripley and others have emphasized the oppressive nature o f Gen.
Nathaniel Banks's contract labor program in Louisiana during the latter years o f the
war, and Martha Bigelow and several others have outlined the disturbing tendency of
army officials in the Mississippi Valley to separate black families and force ablebodied males into military service and unfair contractual plantation labor under ex
masters.5

Other historians have come to startlingly different conclusions. Cam Walker
claims that a camp in Corinth, Mississippi, "very nearly became a kind of
independent community,"6 while Janet Lee Hermann and others have revealed the
existence o f a virtually "independent colony o f contrabands" at Davis Bend,
Mississippi, where blacks controlled the agricultural labor process and created a
functioning plantation court system. Most famously, Willie Lee Rose's prizewinning Rehearsal for Reconstruction argues for the brief existence of self-supporting
contraband colonies on the Sea Islands around Port Royal, South Carolina, where
blacks cultivated the land under "precarious title" and "took care o f their local
•

troubles with aplomb."

o

Throughout this historiographical debate9, scholars have given surprisingly
little attention to contraband camps in Virginia, especially Freedmen's Village, a
"model" settlement that drew unique publicity because of its proximity to Washington
and its location on the famous and picturesque estate o f Robert E. Lee.
Contemporary observers hailed Freedmen's Village as a triumph o f free labor, an
orderly and industrious camp that escaped the crowding and disease that devastated
Washington's urban camps and taught freedpeople the ethic of free labor by allowing
them to cultivate their own land while forcing them to pay rent and taxes. Moreover,
visitors commended the vocational training offered at the camp's Industrial School,
and applauded the top-notch education provided by the missionaries of the American
Tract Society. Newspaper reporters were happily surprised by the attractively
whitewashed houses that held separate nuclear families, and officials were pleased

with the medical care provided by the camp hospital and nursing home for elderly
freedpeople.
The small number o f historians who have examined Freedmen's Village have
rarely questioned the validity of this account; Roberta Schildt has written several
articles praising the conditions o f the camp, while Felix James has focused mostly on
the legal battles involving the Arlington estate during the 1880s and 1890s. Only
Joseph Reidy has produced a truly nuanced study of Freedmen's Village, one that
begins to examine seriously how "freedom" emerged at Arlington; Reidy, however,
focuses almost exclusively on the conservative administration o f the Freedmen's
Bureau.10
This essay will attempt to build on Reidy's work by placing Freedmen's
Village within the general historiographical narrative of contraband camps and
examining the unique version of wartime Reconstruction that emerged in Arlington.
The essay will proceed chronologically through three stages: the founding of
Freedmen's Village in the spring o f 1863, the Village under military rule from 1863
until early 1865, and the administration of the Freedmen's Bureau that began in early
1865. Throughout these stages, careful attention will be given to the interaction of
government officials, American Tract Society missionaries and teachers, and
freedpeople themselves in determining the structure and functioning o f the Village.
Overall, this essay seeks to evaluate one o f America's most famous contraband
settlements. Can Freedmen's Village be more precisely classified as an experiment in
free labor and independence, or as a restrictive camp that foreshadowed the tragic
failings o f postbellum Reconstruction? Or does Freedmen's Village defy simple
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categorization? This essay will attempt to answer these questions by rediscovering
the experience o f thousands o f "contrabands" who tried to define freedom on their
own terms.
In general, government officials and Southern planters rejected the Village
freedpeople’s version of freedom. Despite Republican pronouncements to the
contrary, this essay will argue that Republican theories o f free labor were never
implemented at Freedmen's Village; workers were rarely paid and often beaten by
Village "overseers," while rampant impressment and brutal work schedules prevented
freedpeople from controlling their time or labor. The federal government's concerns
with organizing a potentially troublesome and burdensome population and feeding the
hungry Union army took precedence over introducing freedpeople to a true "free
labor" economy.11
Geographic factors also influenced the development of an exploitative,
publicly controlled labor system at Arlington. Local white residents abandoned the
Arlington region early in the war, allowing the oncoming Union army to occupy the
area without a fight. As a result, Union officials could not (at first) emulate the
contract labor systems used by their counterparts in heavily populated areas of the
South and Mississippi Valley. Exploitative in their own right, these contract labor
systems usually amounted to another version of forced labor—one in which military
and (later) Bureau officials forced freedpeople to sign annual labor contracts with
local planters.
Lacking a local planter class that needed such farm labor, Union officials
decided to create a grossly exploitative labor camp—one that could produce food and
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garments for Union soldiers and needy Washington residents. The labor system
implemented at the Village was therefore the antithesis of the ideal Republican "free
labor" system; it was public rather than private, and freedpeople were not permitted to
control the products of their labor and were never compensated at market value.
As the incoming flood o f freedpeople caused severe crowding in the Village
itself, hundreds o f Arlington Villagers were moved to a separate settlement on
Mason's Island, where they were contracted out to Maryland and Virginia planters
who could travel to the small island and have their pick of available contrabands
living there. Freedpeople were usually forced to sign restrictive one-year contracts
and were rarely given fair compensation for their labor. Though private contracts
appear preferable to Village labor on the surface, in reality such contract systems
expressed the belief—widely held among military and Bureau officials— that
freedpeople were fit only for dependent agricultural labor in the postbellum
economy.12
Predictably, freedpeople resisted both the oppressive Village policy and
contract-based "free labor"; they escaped contracts, brought planters to justice, and
agitated for permanent ownership of Village land, hi doing so, Village freedpeople
articulated their own version o f freedom, one based on independent land ownership
rather than wage labor within a market economy.13

Historians o f wartime and post-war Reconstruction have seldom studied
Virginia's Eastern Shore, a fascinating region that officially rejected secession yet
held fast to traditional Southern values of racism and slavery. When the Shore's most

ardent secessionists fled to the Confederate mainland, they left a population of
landless freedpeople in the hands o f the Union army and federal government. Thus,
the Eastern Shore provided an interesting testing ground for wartime Reconstruction
policy within a nominally Unionist region.
Ironically, the Shore's Unionist stance ultimately worked against the
freedpeople o f Accomac and Northampton counties; while army and government
officials confiscated Confederate land and constructed contraband farming enterprises
throughout the disloyal South, officials on the Shore hesitated to take similar steps
that would inevitably have alienated loyal Shore planters. As a result, federal
officials immediately adopted a brutally efficient contract labor system. Freedpeople
who desperately sought land ownership and financial independence were instead
contractually hired out to local planters under blatantly unfair terms. Despite the
protests o f angry freedpeople and the genuine efforts of a few government officials,
Shore planters abused freedpeople and regularly cheated them out of wages. Shore
freedpeople quickly realized that military and (later) Bureau officials simply did not
believe in the “free labor ideology” o f Radical Republicans; in fact, such officials
used their power to make sure that the majority of Shore freedpeople would be m no
position to compete in the postwar economy.14
Tragically, federal non-intervention extended into the post-war years, when
successful Shore freedpeople (including several ex-Union soldiers who owned
firearms) fell victim to a violent reign o f organized terror directed by local whites. As
masked white men attacked all signs o f black success and community strength,

Freedmen's Bureau officials relied on racist state and county courts that consistently
acquitted known criminals and refused to allow freedpeople to testify.15
The emergence o f a contract labor system on the Eastern Shore also
underscores the influence of geographic factors on Union policy toward freedpeople.
While the lack o f an immediate planter class forestalled the development o f a private
contract labor system in Arlington, the presence o f a large and easily accessible
planter class on the Shore allowed Union officials to avoid any public responsibility
for Shore freedpeople by forcing them to sign private contracts with local planters. In
essence, geographic variations influenced the timing of policy developments; when a
nearby local planter class was available, government officials implemented a contract
labor system immediately. When the opposite was true (as in Arlington), military
officials used the freedpeople for their own purposes before turning them over to
planters when normal economic conditions began to return in 1865.
The stories o f these two communities foreshadowed the larger failures of
postbellum Reconstruction. Conservative military and Bureau officials motivated by
self-interest and open racism shunned radical “free labor ideology” and effectively
allied with Virginia planters to ensure that freedpeople would remain in positions of
economic dependency.
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Chapter 1: "A Return to Their Healthy Avocations as Field Hands":
Republican Free Labor Thought and Freedman's Village

"There is a decided advantage afforded to them o f the salutary effects o f g o o d pure country
air, and a return to their form er healthy avocations as field hands... The arrangement I propose will
not only in my opinion conduce to the sanitary and moral improvement o f the contrabands, but will
save the Government an immense amount o f m oney."
-Lt. Col. Elias M. Greene to Maj. Gen. S. P. Heintzelman on the potential benefits o f
Freedman's Village, May 1863.16

Maryland and Virginia slaves demanded the establishment o f Freedman's
Village in the spring o f 1863. Indeed, slaves inundated the Union army well before
the federal government devised an official procedure for handling fugitives. Initially,
federal officials reassured both loyal and secessionist slaveowners that the Union
military would not interfere with their peculiar institution and would promptly return
any fugitives. However, Southern slaves' hunger for freedom outweighed their fear
o f being caught and returned to vengeful masters. Upon entering Virginia in 1861,
Union army officials were stunned by "the swarms of negroes.. .taking refuge" in
their lines.17 Slave escapes were often quite creative and dramatic; many slaves on the
Eastern coast of Maryland and Virginia secretly climbed into Union naval ships,
while older slave men who encountered friendly Union regiments covertly returned to
their plantations to retrieve their wives and children.

1R
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Consequently, military officers were forced to create a coherent policy for
dealing with thousands o f fugitive slaves. In the spring of 1861, General Benjamin
Butler famously categorized the slaves as "contraband o f war"—material that could
be confiscated because it was valuable to the Confederate army. Congress
immediately provided the legal foundation for Butler's military policy o f keeping
runaways by passing the controversial First Confiscation Act, which declared that
masters who allowed the Confederate army to employ their slaves subsequently
forfeited all claims to them.
Slaves responded enthusiastically, arriving inside Union fortifications in
massive numbers. Slaves from Maryland and Virginia flooded Union lines in
Northern Virginia and escaped to Washington in droves. The process accelerated in
the summer o f 1862, when Congress abolished slavery in the nation's capital and
passed the decisive Second Confiscation Act, which guaranteed freedom for all slaves
who successfully escaped from masters residing in Confederate states. Along the
way, many escapees served as temporary spies for the Union army: the Official
Records o f the war are filled with letters reporting that "a runaway contraband came
in and reported” Confederate troop movements. ^
Despite the passage o f the Confiscation Acts, escape into the Union lines in
and around Washington was risky, particularly for Maryland slaves. Since Maryland
remained nominally loyal to the Union, the Confiscation Acts did not apply there;
runaway slaves from there remained illegal fugitives subject to immediate return and
reenslavement. However, many Maryland slaves continued to pursue freedom and
were aided by Union generals and soldiers who openly disobeyed the Fugitive Slave
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Law. Many Maryland fugitives simply fled to Alexandria County and claimed
Virginia residency, while others escaped directly to Washington, where Northern
regiments provided shelter and protection from loyal Maryland slaveholders.
Maryland fugitives undoubtedly would have been reenslaved more
frequently if not for relatively unknown abolitionist Union generals like Henry
Briggs, who boldly defied the orders of his superior officer by safeguarding fugitives.
When chastised by his commander, Briggs replied, "If the alternative presented to me
was to deliver (the fugitive) up on the claim of a pretended master or to suffer the
consequence o f a disobedience o f law and be dismissed from the service in which I
have volunteered, I should not hesitate to choose the latter."

90

Maryland politicians and slaveholders were incensed by such blatant
violations o f law. Congressmen Charles Calvert demanded that Secretary o f War
Simon Cameron "exclude from all cam ps.. .such slaves as" were the rightful property
o f Maryland whites, and forcefully reminded Cameron that "it is not the desire of this
Government to encourage the escape of this species from lawful owners." 21
•

•

Individual slaveholders hired slave-catchers to infiltrate Union regiments around
Washington and retrieve escaped slaves. However, these ventures were mostly
unsuccessful; dozens of petitions and angry letters complained that Union troops
commonly "surrounded" slave-catchers, "menaced them and applied such
opprobrious epithets, such as Negro stealer and Negro catcher.. .until [they were]
obliged to leave the ground."
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Another slaveholder complained that his chosen agent

was violently expelled by Union troops urging their peers to "shoot him, bayonet him,
kill him, pitch him out!"

23

13

Not all Union regiments were equally welcoming. An abolitionist soldier
privately questioned his general's tendency to act "in strict conformity with general
orders"24 by returning escaped slaves, while another general justified his policy of
capturing and reenslaving all Maryland fugitives by proclaiming that "I care nothing
for this Devilish Nigger difficulty. I desire to save the union, and will cooperate with
the Administration m everything tending to that important result."
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Unfortunately, the punishment for attempted escape was often devastating.
One Maryland slave described the beatings administered to two reclaimed fugitives:

They were both taken to the bam and severely whipped. Their clothes were
raised and tied over their heads to keep their screams from disturbing the
neighborhood and then were tied up and whipped very severely and then taken
to jail. (The woman) had a child about nine months old which was taken from
9
her and died soon after.
f\

Others were sentenced to lengthy terms in Baltimore Penitentiary, while those who
were forced back into the dmdgery of field labor were sometimes denied sufficient
clothing and food.
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Despite these risks, slaves continued to flood Union lines outside Washington.
Able-bodied freedmen built fortifications and cleared roads for the military, while
women, children, and the elderly were mostly sent to temporary contraband
settlements in Washington. Indeed, dozens of soldier diaries mention the "exodus of
contrabands” to the nation's capital, a city that was woefully unprepared to shelter the
large number of freedpeople seeking refuge there.

98

While some able-bodied men

found work at a Washington naval yard, the vast majority o f freedpeople were
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haphazardly shuttled into a series of makeshift camps. Initially, many were crowded
into unused cells at Old Capital Prison, where conditions were deplorable; witnesses
found small cells, each occupied by approximately twenty "contrabands half-clad in
rags," sleeping uncomfortably on the stone floor o f the prison.
By late 1861, the prison already held twice its normal capacity, forcing
government officials to search for new settlements for the overflow o f contrabands.
Newly-appointed Washington contraband superintendent Danforth B. Nichols sent
many ex-slaves to a building known as Duff Green's Row. There, the contrabands
were "herded" into several small gender-segregated and insufficiently ventilated
chambers until a smallpox epidemic devastated the camp in the spring o f 1862.
Nichols also arranged for the construction of several outdoor settlements where most
freedpeople were squeezed into flimsy tents and shoddy cabins. The one-story cabins
measured only 120 square feet but frequently housed ten or more freedpeople, an
unhealthy situation that necessitated "promiscuous herding" and facilitated the deadly
spread o f smallpox. The proliferation o f smallpox cases was accelerated by the lack
o f separate bathroom facilities and became so pronounced that justifiably fearful
Washmgtomans suggested that infected freedpeople be required to post a yellow flag
outside their tent or cabin. Moreover, the unguarded freedpeople at these outdoor
camps were vulnerable to both Maryland slave-catchers and military officials who
often kidnapped unwilling men and forced them into unpaid military labor. Others
were forcefully "bound out" as domestic servants only to be dismissed after a month
and denied pay, while freedpeople who actually received fair wages often fell victim
to local burglars and ruffians.

•0 A
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These intolerable conditions did not go unnoticed. Government investigators
at Old Capitol Prison characterized the camp as "anything but clean and orderly" and
condescendingly suggested that "the negroes be removed to some place to keep them
apart from respectable whites."31 Likewise, military officials warned naval Secretary
Gideon Welles that there were "no longer sufficient accommodations" in the naval
yard for incoming freedpeople.

T9

•

Washington newspapers reported the horrid

conditions o f camp settlements and alleged that an increasing number of
impoverished freedpeople were resorting to theft and other crimes.33
While whites selfishly lobbied for the removal of the "undesirable
contrabands," Washington's liberal reform groups and powerful black community
supported the construction o f a healthy and secure settlement for the benefit of the
freedpeople. District Superintendent Danforth Nichols acknowledged that contraband
families wanted to live separately and have their familial bonds maintained rather
than be grouped with several other families or segregated by sex.34 Washington's
leading black activists and preachers sent letters and petitions to government officials
reminding them that "we see [contrabands] in droves every day perambulating the
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1862, forty black men signed a petition requesting that "there shall be opened to these
'j/r

colored people a region" outside of Washington.

Meanwhile, the Washington

branch o f the National Freedmen Relief Association was formed in 1862 to meet the
"immediate bodily wants" of the ex-slaves by providing them with necessary
clothing, blankets, food, and kindling.

Likewise, Washington's "well-to-do colored
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people" formed the Contraband Relief Association to educate the ex-slaves and
alleviate their physical suffering.
While addressing the immediate concerns o f the impoverished contrabands,
these groups and like-minded missionary associations simultaneously urged the
federal government to construct a more hospitable settlement featuring adequate
housing and the opportunity for semi-independent agricultural labor similar to the
celebrated "free labor" system being utilized on the South Carolina Sea Islands. It
was in this context that Lieutenant Colonel Elias M. Greene—then working as
Quartermaster General—suggested that freedpeople be moved onto a settlement on
Robert E. Lee's estate in Arlington, where "families need not be separated" and
freedpeople could experience the "salutary effects o f pure country air and a return to
their former healthy avocations as field hands." While Greene acknowledged that the
move would lead to the "sanitary and moral improvement of the contrabands," he
tellingly theorized that the camp could "save the government an immense amount of
money" by employing "the force o f contrabands" that had previously been "idle in
this city and a dead weight on the government."

no

While escaped freedpeople received invaluable aid from sympathetic generals
and inter-racial support organizations, their own desire for freedom eventually
produced conditions that led to the founding o f the Arlington camp. At the same
time, however, Elias Greene's statement outlining the potential benefits of Freedmen's
Village suggested that this "model" settlement might ultimately serve the financial
interests o f the federal government rather than the freedpeople themselves.
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"Every one seems contented, and in a m ost prosperous condition... Colonel Green has
p ro vid ed fo r the race a miniature city o f their own, with every auxiliary that can in any manner tend to
their advancement and happiness ...All o f them have taken hold o f their new work with a hearty good
will. The institution is a paying one too!
-Washington Evening Star reporting on Freedmen's Village, December 4, 1863.

"You, not they, will decide when they are to work and when not. Anyone who disobeys will be
sent to the Guardhouse and fe d only bread and water until they are willing to obey orders."
-J. M. Brown to Mr. G. G. Besley, farm supervisor at Freedmen's Village, December 1864.

The few historians who have examined Freedmen’s Village with a critical eye
have focused mostly on the post-war administration of the Freedmen's Bureau.
Consequently, while historians have demonstrated how Freedmen's Village fits within
the pessimistic post-revisionist narrative of post-war Reconstruction, they have failed
to thoroughly analyze the structure of the Village during the war itself. In fact, while
the Village can be called a "model" wartime contraband camp, the restrictive policies
o f military officials and their refusal to embrace free labor ideology foreshadowed the
failures o f post-war Reconstruction.
Freedmen's Village was probably destined to become a famous contraband
settlement. Located just south of Washington and constructed on the grand estate of
the Confederacy's most famous general, Freedmen's Village quickly became a wellknown national showcase for government officials seeking to prove that the federal
government genuinely supported the plight of Southern blacks. Officials deliberately
invited newspaper reporters to the Village, allowing them to admire the "commodious
buildings" that housed separate families, the "comfortable" home for the elderly and
infirm "where every attention (was) paid them by friends of their own color.”
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Reporters also remarked upon the substantially lower mortality rate o f this "clean and
prosperous city."
Several wartime government reports revealed a similar enthusiasm for the
conditions o f the village. The Quartermaster General complimented the "ample
accommodations" o f the Village hospital in 1863; a year later, he still found the entire
settlement "clean and well-policed," and theorized that the Village had "saved the
lives o f hundreds from death and disease." Elias Greene lovingly described the
Village school run by the American Tract Society, emphasizing the "well-ventilated
rooms" and "good furniture" that compared favorably with those of "the best common
schools in the North." Most important, the camp provided "employment for a
considerable number o f men and women not fit" for the brutal physical hardships of
military labor and armed service. Indeed, the government specifically designed
Freedmen's Village as a temporary training facility where women, children, and "nonable" men would learn the essential values of labor and "self-reliance" while the sick
and elderly would be cared for at the expense of the government.40
There was a substantial amount of truth in this positive rhetoric; Freedmen's
Village did indeed feature elements o f "a miniature city" based superficially on free
labor ideology. Black women and "non-able" men independently rented their family
cabins and cultivated their own agricultural plots for a monthly wage of $10, while
other adults attended the vocational Industrial School and Village children learned
literacy and arithmetic at the American Tract Society school. Villagers even paid a
monthly $5 tax into the "Contraband Fund," which financed the daily rations,
clothing, and medical care offered at the Village. Thus, the Village resembled a free,
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self-sustaining community while simultaneously generating surplus food for hungry
soldiers and hefty financial profits for the government through the imposition of
monthly $3 rents.41
Wartime conditions at the Village also compared favorably with those in other
contraband camps nationwide, most notably the remaining settlements in nearby
urban Washington. Throughout the war, the National Freedmen's Relief Association
remained justifiably concerned about the "utter destitution" and "bodily physical
needs" o f Washington contrabands. Their wartime reports overflowed with
references to the "rags called clothes" freedpeople wore, the drastic need for blankets
and bedsteads to battle the crippling cold weather and disease, and the meager rations
of soup the Association was able to provide. Both the NFRA and the Contraband
Relief Association tried to imitate the successful school system implemented at
Arlington, but suffered from "a scarcity o f school rooms and a want o f school
furniture."42
Other Washington settlements designed specifically for orphaned children
utilized "badly constructed barracks full o f cracks and holes" that were "fully
unsuitable for children."42 Freedpeople at the infamous Camp Barker were decimated
by a smallpox epidemic that routinely killed half a dozen residents each day, a
condition that was exacerbated by a lack of bedding and the prevalence of clothing
that inspectors invariably described as "filthy" and "ragged." Overall, mortality
among Camp Barker contrabands stabilized at about half a dozen deaths per day from
a fluctuating population that usually ranged from 500 to 700 freedpeople, while
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Freedmen's Village lost only two residents each day from a population that hovered
between 1, 500 to 2, 200.44
Arlington freedpeople also escaped several o f the hardships that limited the
freedom of contrabands throughout the South. The Village's fortunate geographic
proximity to Washington insulated Arlington residents from the ravages and
disruptions of battle and troop movements that destroyed camps throughout Virginia
and the Mississippi Valley. Arlington's favorable location also guaranteed a fairly
consistent military presence that prevented the widespread slave-catching and
reenslavement that freedpeople in less secure areas faced. Furthermore, a contraband
camp adjacent to Washington on Robert E. Lee's estate almost naturally became a
publicity magnet that pragmatic government officials could advance as a "model"
camp. Finally, the lack o f a large nearby Unionist slave-holding class initially held
off the emergence of a contract labor system like those implemented in loyal areas
such as Virginia's Eastern Shore and in occupied regions like Louisiana and various
locations in the Mississippi basin that fell under the control o f Ulysses S. Grant's
army. 45
Despite these crucial benefits, Freedmen's Village never developed into a truly
autonomous experiment in free labor; historians who have emphasized the
conservative nature o f post-war Reconstruction under the Freedmen's Bureau at
Arlington could readily root their findings in the limited version o f "freedom" that
emerged during the war itself. Indeed, immediately upon the Village’s establishment,
the army officials and camp superintendents in charge o f the Village ignored free
labor ideology entirely by instituting a restrictive wage labor system designed
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primarily to exploit black labor for the benefit o f the federal government and the
Union army. Wages were entirely non-negotiable. Freedpeople received a monthly
wage o f $10, $5 of which was automatically funneled into the expanding Contraband
Fund. Meanwhile, black families were required to supply a monthly rent o f $3,
leaving the majority o f laborers with a perilously scanty income.
Moreover, Villagers exercised minimal control over the labor process;
agricultural workers were often forcibly removed from their farms and employed as
street-sweepers or "whitewashers" in Washington. Likewise, Arlington military
officials displayed a disturbing tendency to spontaneously remove freedpeople and
coerce them into cleaning hospital cesspools and toilets and digging graves at the
National Cemetery at Arlington.46

Sporadic military impressment also limited

freedom at the Village. The few able-bodied men residing in Arlington were "for
months exceedingly annoyed" by Union troops who entered the camp "under various
false pretences, such as visiting friends and relatives," only to "indiscriminately"
apprehend freedpeople and force them into military service. Ironically, the most
devastating act o f impressment was committed by members o f a black regiment who
were offered a profitable bounty payment for each freedman they were able to
"enlist."47
On the "autonomous" farms themselves, the army and the War Department
employed white "overseers" and sternly reminded them that "you, not [the
freedpeople] will decide when they are to work and when not!" Any freedperson
guilty o f disobeying an overseer was immediately imprisoned in the Village
guardhouse and fed only "bread and water until they [were] willing to obey orders."48
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Furthermore, Village superintendent Danforth B. Nichols was notorious among the
freedpeople because o f his penchant for violence and abuse. Village resident Lewis
Johnson testified that
A woman in camp had a little child; Nichols told [the woman] she must go to
work and she told him she was not ready to go to work; he told her she was
and that she must do so; the woman did not go to work, so Mr. Nichols beat
the woman out the camp with one of the soldier's sword canes and his fist. I
can not tell the number o f persons he used to abuse, but there were a great
many. 49
By m id-1864, Quartermaster General Montgomery Meigs admitted that
Village farming "was done by women and the infirm" but defended this policy by
asserting that farming "does not require strength of hand." Moreover, freedpeople
were specifically prohibited from selling their farm products, since the Village's
agricultural produce was mostly reserved for Union troops. Furthermore, mobility
was severely circumscribed; artisans and farmers were not permitted to travel to
nearby markets in Washington and Alexandria without a pass issued by the Village
Superintendent, a luxury that was seldom granted.50
In an effort to obtain their version of freedom, Village blacks consistently
protested these restrictive policies favored by army officials. Freedpeople repeatedly
questioned the propriety of the Contraband Fund and the Village's steep rents. Many
women professed their inability to afford the rent and taxation, accurately claiming
that their husbands' military labor frequently went unpaid. One Village woman
indignantly informed a camp superintendent that "I give up my child upon the word
and honor o f this government to go and tote his musket and he had gone and lost his
life. I think Sir that is enough."51 Village farmers also illegally sold and traded crops
and other marketable goods to local residents, a commonplace violation of Village
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policy that elicited several angry official documents reminding Village guards to
"stop any peddlers about Freedmen's Village from selling or buying clothing and
rags" and other practical necessities such as stoves, farm produce, and beds.52
Most important, Village blacks vehemently protested against the irrational and
violent punishments meted out by Superintendent Danforth Nichols, an effort that led
to Nichols's dismissal. In the most infamous case of physical abuse, Lucy Ellen
Johnson testified that
[Nichols and his guards] fastened a rope around my two thumbs and passing it
over the limb of a tree raised me from the ground so that my weight was
suspended by the thum bs.. .They then took it off and tied it on my wrist—again
raising me as before with arms outstretched and without any power to relieve
myself—In this position one kicked me, another choked my throat, another
stuffed dirty wool in my mouth. After nearly half an hour they released me
and (Nichols) advised me to leave the camp.
Nichols apparently beat and abused Johnson simply because she requested her daily
rations despite suffering from an illness that had prevented her from farming that day,
and because she was married to a military laborer whose wages (which she had not
yet received) theoretically should have been used to purchase sufficient food. 53
Unfortunately, Lucy Johnson was not alone; a black shoemaker named Henry
Cook expressed his desire to market his goods in Washington rather than perform
monotonous agricultural labor by telling an overseer, "I was a free man and could do
what I pleased." The next day, the overseer demanded retribution for this "uppity"
remark: "You damn nigger you come out here and God damn if you don't I will kill
you with this stick!" Cook obeyed and was struck in the head, the blow sending him
sprawling to the ground. The guard pinned Cook down and "began to pound me in
my head and face with his fist, and then just took his two thumbs and commenced to
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gouge right into my eyes and tried to gouge them out." Cook was hospitalized for
two weeks following the beating, and upon his release was immediately dismissed
from the Village for refusing to perform the mandated agricultural labor.54
Meanwhile, several frightened freedpeople testified that Nichols's rage resulted from
his excessive drinking, while another tellingly stated that "My master was a first rate
m an.. .1 would rather be under him by ten degrees than be with Nichols."55
Enough damning evidence was compiled to justify transferring Nichols away
from Freedmen's Village, but overall, freedpeople were unsuccessful in their attempts
to create an independent free labor community. While Freedmen's Village remained
substantially safer and healthier than the vast majority o f Union contraband camps, its
residents were never truly "contented" or "delighted," and the Village itself never
resembled "a miniature city" or a semi-autonomous community o f free laborers.
Throughout the war, Village officials were primarily motivated by military and
financial concerns rather than by any allegiance to free labor or sympathy for the
struggling freedmen. Consequently, they implemented a closely monitored and
controlled wage labor process designed to fatten the federal budget, feed Union
soldiers, and transform the "mass" of "idle" freedmen who would otherwise become a
"dead weight on the government" into profit-making laborers.
Indeed, throughout the war, physical conditions deteriorated and labor policies
became increasingly restrictive. The initial spaciousness and low mortality rates of
Freedmen's Village actually undermined its long-term potential; the contrast between
conditions at Arlington and those in the District quickly became so blatant that the
government relocated thousands of suffering Washington contrabands to Freedmen's
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Village throughout the duration of the war. The largest single transfer involved the
Camp Barker freedpeople, who arrived at the Village in January o f 1864 in "a most
destitute and uncleanly condition," looking "shamelessly wretched," with many
residents "fatally ill with small pox." Disgusted and sympathetic onlookers described
a depressing mass o f "poorly clad, filthy contrabands destitute o f necessary bedding"
and wearing "barely enough clothing to preserve decency." In an observation that
revealed the superior conditions o f Freedmen's Village even as it foreshadowed the
imminent decline in those conditions, H. E. Simmons (an inspector from the Office of
the Quartermaster General) remarked that at Arlington, "[the contrabands] are neat,
tidy, and very comfortable, while [at Camp Barker] they were dirty, discontented, and
uncomfortable. "56
Dozens o f destitute Washington wives of black soldiers and military laborers
also sought and gained admission to Freedmen's Village throughout the war. Women
whose distant husbands earned unreliable army wages were often left to provide for
children without a dependable income o f their own. When these District women sank
into poverty and starvation, they frequently applied for government rations and
financial assistance. The government's response became predictable: "I have no
authority to simply provide rations for wives o f colored soldiers and teamsters—
recommend they apply to Freedmen's Village instead." This policy strengthened
gender hierarchies within the black community; black women were increasingly seen
as helpless dependents, while black men were offered more lucrative jobs in the
public sphere. Indeed, as the war proceeded, Freedmen’s Village essentially became a
refuge for elderly men, children, and women who were deemed unfit for military
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service and labor; by 1865, women constituted over 75 percent of the Village's "ablebodied" population.57
This incoming population compromised the previously healthy physical
conditions at Freedmen's Village. Since the original Villagers occupied the coveted
cabins, military officials initially housed the Washington newcomers in crowded
*

outdoor tents that lacked sufficient bedding material and blankets. These lamentable
conditions and the harsh winter weather combined to kill many o f the new Villagers,
especially the elderly and those who slept directly on the frigid ground. Not
surprisingly, the new residents accelerated the spread of smallpox throughout the
Village and introduced a series o f other deadly diseases that were "contracted in the
move from the city," including scarlet fever and whooping cough.
The influx of freedpeople also produced a crucial shift in Village labor policy.
Since the Village could not feasibly hold the expanding population, military
supervisors decided to deviate from their initial vision of Freedmen's Village as a
profitable experiment in controlled agricultural labor and transformed the Village into
a temporary depot for potential dependent laborers and domestic servants who could
be contractually "bound out" to private employers throughout the country. This labor
policy would be accelerated after 1865 by the Freedmen's Bureau, but it began in
earnest during the wartime administration, a critical issue of timing that has been
overlooked by historians who mistakenly portray wartime Village policy as static.
Indeed, by m id-1864, the military had already transformed nearby Mason's (now
Roosevelt's) Island into a temporary holding ground for those Village residents most
likely to be hired by the private employers who visited the island.
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Though the contract system substituted private wage labor for publicly
monitored work, the practical results o f this change for freedpeople were minimal.
Military and Bureau officials simply kicked contrabands out of the Village and forced
them to sign restrictive one-year contracts with local planters. As a result,
freedpeople were robbed o f any opportunity for economic advancement and instead
placed against their will into positions o f economic dependency under racist Southern
planters.
Investigators from the Inspector General’s Office found the conditions at
Mason’s Island quite appalling— especially compared with conditions in the original
Village. Freedpeople were "promiscuously herded" into crowded military barracks,
the island's water supply was dangerously low, and the inspectors complained of
rapidly spreading disease, the "entire absence of proper drainage," and the disgusting
and unsanitary "accumulation of garbage" on the island. A restrictive pass system
also limited geographic mobility.59
More distressing to military officers on the island was the fact that interested
employers initially refused to hire Island freedpeople, since most were "women with
small children" or "too old for usefulness." Consequently, army officers and newlyhired Island Superintendent Danforth B. Nichols (quickly rehired after his initial
dismissal) took a more forceful and direct role in contract labor negotiations. A
second (and equally outraged) investigator from the Inspector’s Office noted that
Nichols and his advisors endeavored to "get rid of [the freedpeople] in any way, often
by throwing them upon the community at large." Nichols convinced the government
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to print hundreds o f identical apprenticeship and labor contracts that required only the
signature o f an Island official. A typical contract was frighteningly simple:
Elias Greene, Chief Quartermaster of the Department of Washington, has
placed and bound out as an apprentice_________ to learn the trade of
________ until_______.
Labor contracts were identical and almost always included the obligation that
freedpeople and employers contract "for not less than one year." A few contracts
required employers to "comfortably maintain and properly treat" their charges, and
also warned that reports o f "abuse and misuse" would result in the termination of the
contract, though it is unclear how thoroughly officials enforced these requirements.60
However, island officials apparently bound out freedpeople with minimal
judgment or concern for their financial and physical well-being. From July 1864 to
March 1865, the permanent population of both Freedmen's Village and Mason's
Island dropped precipitously: the number of freedpeople in Arlington declined from
2, 200 to 1,400 over this eight-month period; that o f Mason's Island fell from 1, 200
to 500.61 Moreover, with the exception of a few domestic servants hired by wealthy
Northern families, the large majority o f black apprentices and farmers were
contracted to nearby Maryland and Virginia planters, often with disastrous results.
One man returned to Freedmen's Village and testified that his employer "picked up
some bricks, beat him upon the head, knocked him down, cut him with an axe, and
cowhided him" after a dispute over wages. Another Mason's Island ffeedman
reported that after three months o f plantation labor, "he was driven off without any
pay," while several parents helplessly objected to the apprenticing of their children.
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Freedpeople resisted these changes in a variety of ways. As noted above,
several left their private employers and returned to Arlington requesting a more
equitable employment situation or permanent status as Village farmers. Skilled
freedpeople seeking to avoid contract labor simply left the Village and opened
individual or cooperative shops in Washington, while others found paying jobs in
District warehouses, hospitals, hotels, and restaurants.
Most important, Village residents who dreaded both oppressive contract labor
and a return to economic stagnation in Washington steadfastly refused to leave the
relatively healthy and stable Village. One army official on M ason’s Island claimed
that the deplorable conditions there were actually "good because it would be harder to
get [the freedpeople] to leave for service if they were at Freedmen's Village, because
there they have comfortable houses to live in and therefore most o f those negroes are
unwilling to go out to service." Likewise, Elias Greene complained that "freedmen
cannot be induced to take service with private farms and endeavor to return to
Freedmen's Village."

/TO

Though the Village proper was no free labor paradise,

Arlington freedmen decided early-on that they preferred the stability and pseudo
independence o f renting and farming government land to the "freedom" of the private
"free labor" economy.
Thus, despite idealistic government and newspaper rhetoric, Freedmen’s
Village was never an idyllic free labor paradise where freedpeople “delighted” in the
“pure country air” and could be seen “working as free men and women.” The Village
itself was nothing more than an exploitative labor camp erected mostly because
military officials had to do something with a growing number o f freedpeople who
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could not (initially) be foisted upon local planters. When that solution became
insufficient and the Village became overcrowded, military officials resorted to the
solution used throughout the occupied South: forced contract labor. Both policies
were designed with government self-interest in mind, and both worked against the
wishes o f Arlington freedpeople who sought economic independence and land
ownership.
Thus, contemporaries who idealized the Village's wartime conditions and
historians who have made similar errors or focused almost exclusively on the postwar
administration o f the Freedmen's Bureau have ignored the total inapplicability of free
labor ideology in wartime Arlington. Likewise, historians have not provided a
thorough analysis o f the decidedly conservative education provided by American
Tract Society missionaries.
****

"You must think o f these things, and think kindly o f your old master. You have grown up with him, it
may be, on the sam e plantation. Do not fa ll out now, but join your interests i f you can, and live and
die together."
-Plain Counsels for Freedmen. a textbook published by the American Tract Society
"Don't refuse to work then, even at low wages. Work at low wage is better than idleness."
-Friendly Counsels for Freedmen. a textbook published by the American Tract Society

The few historians who have examined Freedmen's Village briefly mention
the existence of a missionary school; a couple join Village officials in celebrating the
"commodious" buildings and the "good furniture" that separated Village schools from
other facilities that used dilapidated church basements or tiny military barracks.64
However, historians have overlooked the conservative and paternalistic tone of Tract
Society education that focused on moral reformation and attempted to discourage
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blacks from pursuing economic gain. Indeed, the educational philosophy o f the Tract
Society dovetailed nicely with the economic beliefs o f Village officials, a unique
occurrence that allowed Tract Society missionaries to operate with an unprecedented
degree o f independence. While the Sea Island "Gideonites" and liberal American
Missionary Association teachers in the Mississippi Valley often clashed with
meddlesome military supervisors and local planters, there is no record o f any similar
ideological disputes at Freedmen's Village.65
Given the Tract Society's historical background, this unique rapport with
conservative government officials is not surprising. In 1825, members o f the New
York and New England Tract Societies decided to combine their efforts by forming
the American Tract Society and moving its headquarters to the heart o f Manhattan.
The Tract Society was strictly non-partisan and its members devoted themselves
solely to the distribution o f religious or religious-themed tracts by authors as diverse
as Jonathan Edwards and Lewis Tappan.
Though the Society aimed to convert America’s downtrodden immigrants and
freedpeople, the ATS kept a safe distance from the abolitionist movement.
Throughout the contentious 1850s, the Society's publishing committee staunchly
refused to publish any tracts critical o f slavery, since the Society's Constitution
specified that tracts must be "calculated to receive the approbation of all evangelical
Christians," including Southern slaveholders.
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However, by 1857, slavery agitation

in Kansas and Nebraska motivated radical members o f the Society to lobby for a tract
outlining the "moral evils of slavery." The result was the ambivalent "Duties of
Masters," which supported the South's peculiar institution but encouraged
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paternalistic masters to treat slaves humanely and provided masters with advisory
chapters regarding "the correction o f servants when they go amiss."

Moderate

Society members were uncomfortable with the "radical" tone of the tract, while
abolitionist members o f the AMA and American Antislavery Society labeled the ATS
an "enemy o f liberty, and the bulwark of oppression."

/ro

Internal strife between conservatives and moderate anti-slavery members
culminated at the Society's annual meeting in 1858, where a few inflammatory
abolitionist speeches further divided the ATS. After the convention, the organization
split into two factions based mostly on the slavery issue. However, the two Tract
Societies were not drastically different; money and members overlapped between the
two, and the "anti-slavery" Boston society continually displeased abolitionist groups
by trumpeting Union and the preservation of "the best government God ever made" as
the primary goals o f the Civil War while failing to embrace the Emancipation
Proclamation.69
Given this moderate background, it is not surprising that paternalistic
moralism defined the educational philosophy of Tract Society teachers and schools.
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since "Some o f your people who have comfortable clothing, when they get a little
money, go and spend it for more clothes that look a little nicer, so that they can make
a fine show at Church."
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Textbooks with condescending titles like Advice to

Freedmen and Plain Counsels fo r Freedmen were largely devoted to religious and
ethical lessons. Popular texts reminded freedpeople that they must "be truthful and
honest," that "one o f the greatest failings of your people is a want of punctuality," that
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drinking alcohol was a terrible sin, and that cleanliness was an important virtue.
These moral exhortations were supplemented with spelling lessons, arithmetic
primers, and rudimentary biological descriptions of various animals. Only the most
advanced textbook (Lydia Maria Child's The Freedmen's Book) contained somewhat
sophisticated biographies o f black historical figures, while the most commonly
published and distributed teaching materials were mostly moralistic and contained
few other educational lessons. Indeed, even The Freedmen's Spelling Book and the
various Freedman's Readers featured a mixture of standard educational lessons and
"temperance songs," Biblical anecdotes, and lists of sins to be avoided.72
Weekly and monthly Tract newspapers and pamphlets distributed at the
Village carried similar messages. The Freedman's Journal and The Freedman's
Advocate typically devoted a single page o f each issue to basic math and spelling
lessons, reserving the several remaining pages for Biblical stories about "The
Prodigal Son" and other topics and written lectures about "thrift," prayer, and the
importance o f stabilized, legal marriages. Interestingly, even the spelling lessons
sometimes focused on words like "divine" and "omnipotent," and a copy o f the Ten
Commandments appeared regularly m each publication.
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Even visiting teacner ana

famous charity worker Sojourner Truth publicly ordered Arlington freedpeople to "be
clean, for cleanliness is next to godliness," chastised them for "living in disgrace off
the government," and privately complained that the freedpeople were "very ignorant
in relation to house-keeping" and sorely lacked "industry" and "independence."74
Though these exhortations on work ethic and moral virtue were common
among most abolitionists, the Tract Society’s theories of labor and economics

34

remained relatively conservative. Though Tract Society teachers did not actively
coerce Arlington freedpeople into signing contracts or laboring for the government
(as did military and Bureau officials), their teaching philosophies lent tacit approval
to the government policy o f forcing freedpeople to reside (permanently) on the
bottom rung o f Virginia’s economic ladder. Textbooks emphasized "the importance
o f complying strictly with your contracts," and several textbooks and pamphlets
reminded freedpeople that "the greater part of the freedmen will employ themselves
in farming. We think o f them as plowing, sowing, planting, hoeing, weeding,
digging, haying, and harvesting." Most tellingly, Tract Society missionaries openly
encouraged freedpeople to sign labor contracts with ex-masters, even when
contractual terms seemed unfavorable. Missionaries attempted to assuage black fears
by assuring freedpeople that they "should have confidence in masters" and that they
"need not be afraid to sign any contract which a master will sign first."75
Missionaries also advised freedpeople on the importance o f avoiding
economic self-interest:
Some o f you may object to signing contracts because you think you ought to
have m ore.. .Had freedom come to you at the beginning of the year, the
planter could have done much more for you. You could have raised more
com, could have raised even a fine crop of cotton to help both you and the
planter. But, your freedom came too late for this, so you must now make the
best o f it; you can try to do better for next year.
Another textbook simply reminded freedpeople not to "refuse to work, even at low
wages. Work at low wages is better than idleness."

7 fs

Thus, Tract Society missionaries and Village officials each defined black
freedom in very limited terms; freedpeople were intended for subordinate agricultural
labor governed by restrictive contracts and overseen by planters. This conservative
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educational philosophy conflicted with the more traditional ideological basis of
District schools administered by the AMA and the National Freedmen’s Relief
Association, which offered "a thorough English and classical education" equivalent to
that "taught in our best Academies."
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Unfortunately, it is virtually impossible to know how Village blacks
responded to Tract Society teachings. School attendance was apparently exemplary
among both adults and children, declining only as the overall population of the
Village decreased beginning in m id-1864. While Village blacks were undoubtedly
eager to obtain much-needed literacy, they simultaneously expressed their rejection of
the limited Tract Society version of "freedom" in their determined efforts to acquire
the benefits of liberty and free labor. Many Arlington freedpeople also ignored
missionary lectures on the importance of documented legal marriage; missionaries
and teachers constantly criticized the tendency o f Village men and women to "take
up" with each other in "promiscuous" common law marriages. Although the effect of
Tract Society philosophy on the minds of black students is impossible to ascertain,
historians who have blindly celebrated the spacious Tract Society school and the
"eagerness" o f Arlington’s black students have overlooked the Society’s rejection of
free labor ideology and the limited model o f freedom that the Society’s missionaries
and textbooks proposed.
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"She is a woman o f disreputable character, and o f that class o f women here who entertains
the idea that freedom means to do and say what they please. This woman, having been acting
disgracefully, and the reason I p la ced her in the guardhouse was that she told me that I had no control
over her actions that she was free, and could and would do as she pleased. "
-Village superintendent describing Village resident Caroline Shelton, April 1867.
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Though previous historians have focused almost exclusively on the
conservative nature o f Freedmen's Bureau policy at the Village, Bureau officials
simply accelerated the already ongoing process of removing Village freedpeople by
encouraging them to sign private labor contracts or evicting them from the Village
with little prior notice. However, the Bureau devised harsher and more effective
means for accomplishing this goal. Bureau officials supplemented a more thorough
contract labor system by intentionally eliminating the physical and environmental
advantages o f the Village. First, Village superintendents demanded that nearly
- everyone perform mandatory agricultural labor; many elderly and infirm patients
were removed from the Home and hospital and forced into field labor, and several
handicapped and crippled residents had their labor exemptions revoked. Freedpeople
claiming that their physical disabilities or age prevented them from performing
mandated labor and chores were summarily evicted. Government officials also fired
and evicted freedpeople who had previously served as paid hospital laborers and
"washerwomen," while those lucky enough to retain their non-agricultural jobs and
residences worked without remuneration.
By the end o f 1866, wages for all agricultural laborers were eliminated, and
daily food rations were cut in half. In addition, Bureau officials suddenly demanded
that all rent payments be submitted one week prior to the first o f each month, a policy
that seemed unreasonable to freedpeople who no longer received regular wages and
often had to wait for months until distant husbands and fathers were able to send a
portion of their military wages. Those who failed to furnish the appropriate rent
payments faced immediate eviction.79
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The Bureau also allowed the physical conditions o f the Village to deteriorate.
.By late 1866, Bureau investigators sympathetic toward the freedpeople reported that
Village residents could only make a "scanty living," and that the Village cabins were
"exceedingly filthy" and suffered from leaky roofs and a disagreeable odor. Bureau
investigators also declared that Village privies were "unfit for use," and noted that the
Home for the aged and infirm was becoming notorious for its "insufficient
accommodations and heating." Inspectors found that "all the heating stoves are
broken and worthless," forcing "uncomfortable" residents o f the Home to "huddle
over" the single functioning stove. Consequently, mortality rates among infants and
elderly Villagers increased markedly beginning in 1866, while Mason's Island
remained a deplorable haven for disease, crowding, and high mortality rates.
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Though a few Bureau officials and investigators tried their best to expose the
new rigid policies and declining conditions at the Village, they amounted to a tiny
faction whose bureaucratic whistle-blowing could not overcome the widely-held
desire to dismantle the Village. Indeed, despite these reports, Bureau officials in
Arlington continued the effort to eliminate the black "financial burden" by relocating
freedpeople on nearby plantations without regard for their physical safety or financial
well-being. One Bureau official declared that "blacks should go back into the
country, both in Virginia and Maryland, to find work!"81 Like their wartime
predecessors, Bureau agents in Alexandria County and Mason's Island forced
freedpeople to sign labor contracts with local planters. Records from Mason's Island
indicate that laborers and apprentices invariably found work with planters (often
former slaveowners) in Maryland and Virginia, and that the majority (over 85
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percent) o f contracted adults were women, many of them separated from their
children. Mothers with infants and dependent children were usually "unable to obtain
jobs" and were either evicted or left to "live in rags" on Mason's Island until more
generous employers arrived. 82
Letters and petitions sent to the Bureau by contracted workers reveal that
Virginia and Maryland employers were unwilling to provide freedpeople with the
benefits and liberties ideally associated with free labor. Several ex-Villagers received
scanty wages o f $8 or less per month, while others were dismissed without payment.
When one freedman inquired about unpaid wages, his employer "knocked him down
with the back o f an axe" and informed the worker that his wages were being withheld
because "he was not in the fields early enough."
that he was "treated badly, whipped, and ill-fed,"

An unlucky apprentice revealed
QA

while another freedman working

in Maryland complained "of not receiving any compensation for my services—no
clothing, no chance for school—nothing but whippings."
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The same man also

claimed that he was "struck with a shovel, injuring my head very badly" after he was
unable to repair a broken cooking stove. A group of Village freedpeople "bound out"
to Arkansas planters endured similar hardships. 86
Freedpeople did not passively submit to these efforts to remove them from the
Village. Led by black Village preacher Robert Laws, Arlington freedpeople fiercely
protested the new harsh work orders and widespread evictions. Residents held a
series o f conventions during which they labeled the Bureau a collection of
"copperheads" who "took all our wages away" and unfairly reduced rations to a
dangerously low level. Laws and several other respected black leaders denounced the
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Bureau for "turning us out as if we were brutes," and pointedly reminded Bureau
officials that "women who have lost husbands and sons to the causes o f liberty and
Civil War are being evicted!" Individual freedpeople criticized the Bureau for
"requiring those who are too much incapacitated to do work they can't perform,"
while Laws and other literate leaders wrote petitions on behalf of those who had been
"put out o f doors" and had their "furniture thrown in the street" for failing to submit
rent payments in advance. Petitions and letters of complaint poignantly related
stories o f "old people here thrown out in the cold" without "even a shirt to their
name."87
Most importantly, Village residents boldly staked their claim to independent
land ownership rights. Reverend Laws encouraged his followers to petition Congress
for permanent residency at the Village, reminding listeners that their rent payments
and monthly contributions to the Contraband Fund had "built this [camp]." Villagers
urged Congress to allow "us to judge who should stay and be removed," and Laws
and a group o f petitioners informed Congress that "you need not find [Village
freedpeople] one ration or clothe [sic]," and that Villagers were prepared for Congress
to "rest some o f the responsibilities on U S!" Meanwhile, the few able-bodied
residents who had accumulated significant incomes successfully convinced Bureau
officials to lease 280 acres of Village farmland to residents willing to pay $1 per acre.
A few dozen families thus became semi-independent leaseholders, while many of the
evicted freedpeople built shanties and cultivated abandoned land located just outside
•

the boundaries o f the Village.

RQ
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Many freedpeople simply continued to avoid the contract system entirely.
Government officials admitted that "by far the greatest difficulty is between freedmen
and white people relating to contracts and arises often from there being no settled and
definite contracts m ade.. .Freedmen apparently receive ideas that are entirely different
from what was intended." Thus, many literate freedmen simply refused to participate
in any contractual agreements, while others were allowed to reenter Freedmen's
Village after government inquiries revealed "deliberate intention on the part o f some
employers to swindle them."
Black leaders also circumvented the Bureau's contract system by privately
negotiating with Northern employers who needed domestic servants and laborers.90
Thus, Rev. Laws often traveled to Connecticut and Massachusetts with Village
residents seeking employment, while Sojourner Truth found several families in
upstate New York who could provide "good places" and fair wage rates for black
women and children. Overall, those Villagers fortunate enough to find employment
in the Northeast seem to have fared better than their counterparts in the South, but at
least one freedman returned from Tarrytown, New York, after his designated family
"had no place to put him."91
In their efforts to become independent landowners and avoid unfair labor
contracts, Village blacks articulated their own alternative version o f freedom, one that
was very different than the "freedom" proposed by Village officials and local
planters. Blacks envisioned a post-slavery economy based on independence and land
ownership. By rejecting dependent contractual relationships and agitating for
permanent Village residency, Arlington freedpeople staked their claim to economic
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independence and tried to create a self-sufficient agricultural community that could
exist somewhat separately from the broader wage-based market economy.
These efforts were at best only partially successful. While a minority of
Bureau officials questioned the "unnecessary severity o f the order that all
unemployed must leave" and opposed the evictions of those who were unable to pay
rent in advance, Village policy remained essentially unchanged throughout 1867.
The unemployed continued to be evicted, rations were never increased, wage labor
was entirely eliminated, and advance rent payment remained a prerequisite for
continued residency. In addition, Rev. Laws was deemed an unwanted agitator and
expelled from the Village in early 1867, robbing the freedpeople o f their most
respected and influential leader. Those enterprising freedpeople who constructed
their own shanties and farms beyond the boundaries of the Village proper were
removed to Washington to fend for themselves and had their houses destroyed.
Sensing the hopelessness o f their existence in Arlington, many freedpeople
voluntarily left, moving to nearby Washington or resigning themselves to a year of
contract labor under a local planter.94
As the black population dwindled throughout 1867 and the Freedmen's
Bureau neared expiration, the government moved to dismantle the Village entirely,
threatening to sell the buildings and evict the remaining freedpeople, a group
composed o f able-bodied leaseholders and their families. In a last-ditch effort to
acquire some semblance o f true land ownership, these freedpeople appealed for a
delay and eventually convinced federal officials to extend their leases for two
additional years. When those leases finally expired in 1870, the government refused
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to renew them but allowed the freedpeople to remain settled on the Arlington estate
on the condition that "they are to acquire no title to the land and are to move when
required." Under these terms, the freedpeople lived relatively unmolested until the
early 1880s, when a series of legal cases and property disputes began which resulted
in their official expulsion in 1900, though most of the remaining freedpeople vacated
the Village during the 1890s. While the ex-"contrabands" and their descendants were
ultimately compensated for the value of their dwellings and their earlier contributions
to the long-defunct Contraband Fund, their final eviction merely highlighted their
continued inability to achieve true freedom and independence.95

The post-war story o f Arlington freedmen paralleled that o f freedmen
throughout the South. For the majority o f Village blacks, postwar Reconstruction
administered by the Freedmen's Bureau produced an incomplete version o f freedom
that failed to satisfy their desire for land ownership and economic independence.
Like freedpeople throughout most o f the South, Villagers were either left to fend for
themselves without a sufficient economic foundation or coerced into signing
restrictive one-year contracts that left them landless and vulnerable to oppressive and
unreasonable white planters.
This was not simply a postbellum phenomenon; Freedmen's Village had never
developed into an idyllic community of independent laborers, and wartime military
officials and Village superintendents never embraced or even applied free labor
ideology at the Village itself. Motivated primarily by budgetary concerns and their
fears that freedpeople would constitute a financially burdensome population, Village
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officials designed a "profitable” system at the expense o f the long-term economic
well-being o f the freedmen, who were denied sufficient wages, economic
independence, and land ownership.
Reporters, government officials, and modem historians who celebrated the
wartime "golden age" o f Freedmen's Village have overlooked the extremely low
wages, exorbitant rent charges, harsh restrictions on mobility, and verbal and physical
abuse that circumscribed the black "freedom" that emerged in Arlington from 1863 to
1865. Indeed, while the Village certainly deserved praise for its relatively healthy
and sanitary physical conditions, its labor policies resembled those o f less celebrated
camps where blacks were denied land ownership and control over the labor process
itself. Freedmen's Village officials refused to emulate the more liberal labor
experiments utilized on the South Carolina Sea Islands and Davis Bend plantation.
The overcrowding o f the Village after 1863 resulted in the development o f a
repressive contract labor system that usually placed freedpeople in dependent
economic positions—a scenario that became the hallmark o f postwar Reconstmction.
Consequently, the Village more accurately fits the "halfway house" concept proposed
by Louis Gerteis and other historians; Arlington freedpeople successfully struggled to
eradicate the vestiges o f chattel slavery, but were unable to obtain the full benefits of
liberty and free labor. Despite the determined efforts o f freedpeople who sought their
own version o f freedom, government policy at Freedmen's Village and Mason's
Island anticipated the tragic failures o f post-war Reconstmction throughout the South.
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Chapter 2: "Negroes are Hired Out for Merely a Pittance": Contract Labor on
the Eastern Shore
"[Residents o f the Eastern Shore] think i f we go among them it w ill be to steal and
emancipate their negroes. When these apprehensions are corrected the reaction in our favor must be
great."
-Major General John A. Dix, president o f the Union Defense Committee, November 8,

1861.96

At the outset o f the Civil War, Union officials handled potentially secessionist
slaveholders on Virginia’s Eastern Shore with caution, hoping to secure a teetering
Unionist region that would help guarantee the tenuous loyalty o f neighboring
Maryland. This cautious and pragmatic approach would define the federal
government's "contraband" policy along the Eastern Shore; while Union officials
willingly confiscated abandoned land for contraband agricultural settlements in
openly disloyal regions, the overriding aim of preserving fragile Shore Unionism
prevented similar developments in Northampton and Accomac counties.
Thus, while freedpeople in mainland Freedmen's Village, the Mississippi
Valley, and the South Carolina Sea Islands labored on temporary agricultural
settlements under varying degrees o f freedom, Shore freedpeople were almost
immediately forced into private contract labor in order to please local white
employers. Shore freedpeople became some o f the first to experience the limits of
post-emancipation economic "freedom" as defined by oppressive private contracts
and limited government intervention.
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Interaction between federal officials and Shore residents began in late 1861,
when worried Union officials took notice o f increased secessionist activity on the
Shore. In several letters written during the summer of 1861, Major General John A.
Dix warned his superiors of "a camp o f secessionists, variously estimated from one
thousand to three thousand men" on the Shore. Dix worried that the well-organized
and heavily armed secessionists were becoming "active and confident," and
complained that Shore Unionists were "discontented and to some extent depressed."
Most important, Dix worried that the loss o f Virginia's Eastern Shore (still nominally
Unionist) would jeopardize the loyalty o f Maryland. Dix repeatedly warned Lincoln's
closest advisors that "the Eastern Shore o f Maryland [is] in great danger," that it was
"defenseless," and that local Maryland Unionists were "unable to arrest the
secessionists that are now passing in great numbers through that section to the Eastern
Shore o f Virginia, where the Confederates are getting together a pretty formidable
force."97
For the excitable Dix, Virginia's Eastern Shore was the linchpin of Unionism
in the Chesapeake; the fall o f Northampton and Accomac to secessionism would lead
to the loss o f an already divided Maryland, and, ultimately, the defeat o f the Union
cause. Dix urged Union officials to take action. For months, Dix sent apocalyptic
letters to Secretary o f War Simon Cameron, General George McClellan, and several
other Union officials, recommending that "three or four regim ents.. .be sent [to the
Eastern Shore].. .to break up this camp of secessionists.. .The exhibition of such a
force and the destruction of the secession camp would have a salutary effect
throughout the Eastern Shore of Maryland and Virginia." After a few months of
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military inaction, Dix again suggested that "there be prompt and decisive action.. .It is
extremely desirable to have a decided demonstration of force [on the Eastern Shore]
by the 1st o f N ovem ber...,” he continued. “The election in this State comes off on
the 6th, and our Union friends in [Northampton and Accomac counties] are
disheartened and in danger of being overawed b y .. .these rebel organizations."

QQ

Though the upcoming elections were merely contests for the usual local and ,
county posts, they were nonetheless crucial, since they were largely contested
between unionist and secessionist candidates seeking to control the politics and courts
o f the Shore, not to mention the overall tenor o f Shore life. With such high stakes
hanging in the balance, Dix was finally given permission to organize a military
expedition to the Shore. The conciliatory tone o f the bloodless expedition and its
emphasis on encouraging Unionism rather than punishing disloyalty set the tone for
Union policy that would largely cater to the interests o f whites on the Shore. Dix
provided commanding General H. H. Lockwood with a force o f 3,500 men that was
explicitly designed to "overawe the opposition." Moreover, Dix assured President
Lincoln that the expedition would proceed by "giving [Shore whites] the strongest
assurance o f kind treatment and protection if they do not resist the authority of the
Government.. .1 trust—I ought to say I hope rather than I trust—that they may be
gained over without bloodshed." Dix reminded General Lockwood that "your force is
intended for the protection of loyal and peaceable citizens; you will see that it is not
perverted by the misconduct of anyone under your command to their annoyance."
Dix added force to this warning by ordering Lockwood to punish any soldier who
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"might commit any outrage on the person or property of any citizen" with a stint "in
the irons."99
Most important, in a November proclamation to Shore residents, Dix
promised that Union troops would not interfere with slavery on the Shore:
The Military Forces o f the United States are about to enter your Counties as a
part of the Union. They will go among you as friends, and with the earnest
hope that they may not, by your own acts, be forced to become your enemies.
They will invade no rights o f person or property. On the contrary, your laws,
your institutions, your usages will be scrupulously respected. There need be
no fear that the quietude o f any fireside will be disturbed, unless the
disturbance is created by yourselves. Special directions have been given not
to interfere with the condition o f any persons held to domestic service; and, in
order that there may be no ground fo r mistake or pretext fo r
misrepresentation, commanders have been instructed not to permit any such
persons to come within their lines (italics mine).100

On the surface, Lockwood’s expedition accomplished all o f Dix's stated goals.
Though the Confederate militia had anticipated the expedition's arrival by burning
bridges and "throwing trees across roads," Union troops met no military opposition.
Soldiers testified that many of the "rebels were dispersed to their homes," and that a
"large body" o f the Confederate militia” had fled South.. .and were trying to escape
over to the mainland."
Troop behavior was exemplary; soldiers invited local whites to join in the
singing o f the national anthem, and Shore whites were provided with "the most
abundant compensation for everything that was taken, or claimed to have been taken"
by Union soldiers. Newspaper accounts and private diaries indicate that General
Lockwood whipped and expelled local slaves who tried to escape from their masters,
a gesture that "had much to do with winning back the feelings of these people." One
soldier claimed that the expedition had been successful in "restoring confidence to
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Unionists and demoralizing the secessionists," an assessment that was apparently
validated on election day, when both Eastern Shore counties rejected secession
ordinances and instead elected Unionist officials to local posts.101
The outcome o f the Dix expedition did not bode well for Shore freedpeople.
With local planters in abundance, military officials could bypass Village-style labor
camps and move directly to forced contract labor as a means o f eliminating public
responsibility for the ever-growing class o f freedpeople. The coercive nature o f the
system and the lack o f sufficient federal oversight o f contracts and labor relations
exposed the irrelevance o f radical “free labor ideology” in the real world o f wartime
Reconstruction.
Despite the 1861 election results cited above, the Dix expedition also failed to
eradicate secessionism from the Shore. Many Confederates sympathizers simply kept
quiet during the expedition and subsequent election, while many others returned
periodically from mainland Virginia. Just months after the expedition, General
Lockwood him self returned to the Shore and concluded that "the mild and kind policy
o f General Dix, in-so-far as the building up o f loyal sentiment is concerned, has
proved a failure." Wartime and postwar violence and labor conflicts quickly exposed
the hollow nature o f Dix's victory, a "triumph" that left freedpeople to fend for
themselves amidst a community o f hostile, racist whites.

im

When army officials returned to investigate labor relations on the Shore in
1863, they found a chaotic situation that required some government action. Military
investigators concluded that most Shore residents were "secesh," and warned federal
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officials in Washington that Shore whites were "feeding and helping rebel guerillas"
and conducting illicit trade with mainland Confederate forces. One army investigator
called for immediate reinforcements to prevent the "raids and rumors o f raids from
rebels on the other side o f the [Chesapeake] Bay" and to deal "with plenty o f evil
disposed persons on the Shore." 103
Perhaps more pressing was the problematic relationship developing between
Shore freedpeople and local whites. Investigators reported that most of the
freedpeople on the Shore were "black women and children turned off by masters"
who had either fled to the mainland. Moreover, there was no uniform labor policy for
freedpeople who remained on local farms; investigators distinguished between
freedpeople who were "working at wages" and "others working for their old masters
without wages."104
Thus, by 1863 the bulwark of Unionism had become a region teetering on the
brink o f large-scale black poverty. Though the Shore remained nominally Unionist,
occasional "raids" revealed the depth of racism and secessionism in Northampton and
Accomac. Army officials on the Shore (including the Provost Marshal) were also
worried about the growing population o f landless and unemployed "freed slaves
living in idleness," a group that represented a potentially disastrous financial public
burden. Army officials did acknowledge that "whites encouraged such disorderliness
by refusing to employ or assist Negroes and by treating them cruelly in some
instances."105
Throughout 1863 and early 1864, army officials devised various methods for
restoring order to the Eastern Shore. One military official characterized the Shore as
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"a virgin field" for black soldiers, and recommended the conscription o f all ablebodied males ages 18-45. Meanwhile, Colonel C. S. Henry ordered the construction
o f a Negro House o f Refuge for the infirm, and the military provided rations for
"destitute Negroes and soldier's wives," though many were forced to travel over 40
miles to receive their rations. Soldiers herded other women and elderly freedpeople
into inadequate makeshift Houses o f Refuge. One employee at a Refuge house
complained that "I have about 50 [freedpeople] piled into a kitchen and b a m .. .1 have
nothing for them to eat and no implements for them to work with."106
This incipient federal charity program was complimented by a rudimentary
federal labor program. Military officers stationed at the Office o f the Provost
Marshal on the Eastern Shore organized unemployed contrabands into geographic
"districts" where they would work as farmers on abandoned land. Crucially, the land
was not to be controlled by the federal government or the freedpeople themselves;
rather, abandoned land was to be leased to local whites who would hire freedpeople
on a contractual basis. Army officials added one more harbinger o f future problems
for freedpeople: they were not allowed to leave their districts— roughly equivalent to
Shore towns—without a government-issued passport.107
By November 1864, army officials were forced to admit that these initial
plans had failed. A series o f investigators led by new Provost Marshal Col. Frank
White concluded that further government action was needed “in order to end the evils
on the Shore: the idleness of Negroes and the bad or improper treatment by masters
o f servants.” Local masters often refused to pay wages to black farmhands, a
scenario that allegedly resulted in freedpeople “refusing to labor for a livelihood and
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subsisting in part by depredations upon the property of others.” Meanwhile, black
women and children “were mostly destitute and greatly in need of assistance.”108
Officials devised a dual strategy to solve the Shore’s growing economic and
racial problems. First, Provost White and his military aides essentially forced blacks
to engage in contract-based agricultural labor. Beginning on January 1, 1865,
soldiers at the Office of the Provost Marshal proclaimed that “all persons over 16 not
engaged in employment will report to this office in order that work may be found for
them. None who are able to work can be allowed to remain in idleness.” In addition,
army officials explicitly ordered “all Negroes” (presumably over 16 years o f age) to
find employment within thirty days, after which time “employment will be furnished
for them.” Federal workers assured local whites that “all persons desiring to procure
house servants or field laborers o f any kind.. .will be supplied without delay.”109
To their credit, soldiers and federal bureaucrats did try to help freedpeople by
strictly overseeing contract negotiations between freedpeople and planters. The new
regulations outlawed the vague, easily exploited verbal contracts often favored by
planters, and prohibited the imposition of wage ceilings for black workers.
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and planters were warned that “bad or cruel treatment shall be considered a violation
o f contract.” Despite these apparent safeguards, army officials limited the mobility of
freedpeople by demanding that all contracts be made on a monthly, seasonal, or
tVi

annual basis, and by allowing “only 1/20 or 1/10 ” o f the local black population to
“hire themselves out as day laborers”— a lucrative opportunity given only to those

52

freedpeople who could obtain a certificate signed by six local whites who were
willing to characterize the individual as “trustworthy.”110
Though a well-organized and closely monitored contract labor system
promised potential benefits for unemployed and unpaid freedpeople, the ideological
justifications provided by military officials foreshadowed the dangers and limitations
o f such a system. One official claimed that widespread contract labor would “furnish
to the farmers and residents o f this Shore, economical and regular labor, and to the
colored, a lawful and profitable means o f subsistence.” Provost Marshal and Lt. Col.
Frank J. White—the architect o f the contract plan—echoed these sentiments,
trumpeting the system’s potential effectiveness in “solving the want o f labor for
[Shore] farmers” and “preventing the idleness o f Negroes and the concomitant evils
o f thievery and general demoralization, evils that [contract labor] shall correct by
forcing all Negroes to work.”111
When evaluating the system in early 1865, White displayed the cultural
arrogance and insensitivity typical o f mid-nineteenth century white officials,
emphasizing that “the education o f slavery taught [freedpeople] to have no care for
the future.. .The rights of property to them were a farce.” For White, the legacy of
slavery resulted only in “idleness, dishonesty, and disease,” and the contract labor
system was the only viable method of “social and moral elevation” for Shore
freedpeople. Indeed, White dismissed federal philanthropy as “lacking all practical
sense,” and rejected the alternative (used at Freedmen’s Village and other openly
disloyal areas) o f government-sponsored “contraband farms,” since such settlements
encouraged the formation o f isolated all-black communities that would inevitably
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engender “distrust” and suspicion among local whites. Finally, White argued that
Shore freedpeople would be helpless within a commercial or industrial economy,
since such spheres were dominated by “enterprising men o f commerce” and thus
represented “labor markets where Africans cannot compete."
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These statements make it unmistakably clear that the contract labor system set
up on the Eastern Shore was designed primarily to benefit local whites. Military
officials were determined to avoid the expensive responsibility o f providing direct
financial aid to Shore freedpeople, and barely considered supplying freedmen with
local land. In their desire to reward “Unionist” Shore farmers with a stable and
profitable labor system, federal workers merely echoed the philosophy o f the earlier
Dix expedition. Likewise, their narrow-minded and condescending characterization
o f blacks as inferior beings corrupted by slavery and best suited to dependent
agricultural labor mirrored the educational philosophy of the American Tract Society.
Not surprisingly, the advantages theoretically offered by the contract labor
system melted away when it was actually implemented; without the direct aid of
federal officials who consistently avoided intervening in the “free labor” economy,
Shore freedpeople suffered from the unfair contracts and blatant exploitation that
would define the postbellum black experience throughout the South.
The second element o f the 1864 reorganization o f the Eastern Shore was a
limited charity program. The same November 1864 proclamations issued by the
Provost Marshal that outlined the contract labor system also accepted the notion that
“assistance in sickness, destitution, or distress shall be given by this government.”
The military financed a series o f local “asylums” for the aged and infirm, and did
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reserve small tracts o f land (often adjacent to the asylums) for “government farms to
be used only for such as from old age or physical infirmity are absolutely unable to
support themselves.” Federal officials approved the formation o f public markets that
would sell the “necessities o f life” at affordable prices, and continued to provide
rations for “soldiers’ wives,” “destitute contrabands,” and the inmates o f government
asylums.113
Unfortunately, government charity was often insufficient and was gradually
reduced still further. The inmates o f several asylums were “in very great need of
clothing and blankets,” and many hospital patients were eventually forced to work on
adjacent government farms. Meanwhile, one farm superintendent regretted that he
could “not guarantee shelter” for many o f his laborers.
As the war went on, army officials became less willing to provide charity for
any freedpeople, regardless o f age or physical condition. An edict of January 1865
requested that the superintendents of the Shore’s most prominent government farm
(fittingly named for John Dix) send all resident women and children to the local
federal office to find contractual employment. A month later, Colonel Frank White
suggested that “no issue [of rations] be made at all to the contrabands, except in such
special cases of destitution as in any judgment may require assistance.” White then
claimed that he could “reduce by one half the current rations if all [freedpeople] are
required to work.” A year later, army officials finally limited rations only to “such
[freedpeople] as are in a hospital or sick and under treatment by a surgeon.” This
solution was supposed to ensure that all Shore freedpeople would “be made to
provide for themselves and their families.”114
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As was the case at Freedmen’s Village, federal officials avoided widespread
philanthropy in fear o f creating a dependent and financially burdensome black
population. Though this fear was certainly justified, freedpeople with limited
financial resources and experience could not be expected to succeed without
sustained assistance from the federal government. In some respects, the system of
contract labor used on the Shore (and elsewhere) was designed specifically to prevent
freedpeople from having financial success. Military officials ignored other radical
alternatives (like land ownership) and instead created a coercive system o f contract
labor under which local planters essentially “drafted” freedpeople for positions as
- subordinate laborers—positions that many military officials saw as permanent and
just..
Despite promises o f increased government regulation, Shore whites used the
contract labor system to exploit black laborers. When the Freedmen’s Bureau
assumed control of Shore labor relations in the spring of 1865, Bureau investigator
Stuart Barnes criticized the state o f contractual labor relations on the Shore. Barnes
said that he would
report favorably on [the contract system] and call it beneficial to the Negro and
his employer if properly managed, but I must say that in very many instances the
power o f the Assistant Superintendent o f Labor has been very badly abused and
hundreds o f Negroes are hired out for merely a pittance, much less than they
could earn, as day laborers, and much less than the employers acknowledge they
are worth.
Bames also found evidence that army had long been embezzling funds intended for
asylums and hospitals, though he admitted that in at least a few asylums “the sick are
well-cared for and the accommodations are ample.” Bames did, however, find other
hospitals where “enfeebled Negroes” lived in “exceedingly poor accommodations.”
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White him self conceded that agricultural “employees had not been paid in many
instances for seven months, although many o f them were poor Negroes whose
families were starving while they were working.”115
Available labor contracts from 1864 and 1865 validate Barnes’s pessimistic
conclusions. Though White and his military comrades had expected freedpeople to
earn approximately $100 per year, available contracts indicate that most earned well
under half that sum (some even less than $30 for an entire year!), while many others
(especially women) were paid nothing after agreeing to contracts that provided only
“food, shelter, and clothing” in exchange for labor. Contracts were invariably made
for the duration o f one year and usually stipulated that time missed due to sickness or
physical injury resulted in non-payment o f wages. Planters regularly withheld one
month’s wages until the final settlement of the contract— an event that planters could
intentionally avoid by dismissing freedpeople prior to the termination o f the contract
or behaving so abusively that workers simply left voluntarily, allowing the employer
to simply pocket the final m onth’s wages.116
Predictably, outraged Shore freedpeople expressed concerns over the
emerging system. In early 1865, ffeedman B. L. Parish, writing “at the most earnest
request o f all the free men o f color o f this place,” angrily chastised the federal
government for “employing none but the most rabid secessionists” to oversee labor
relations on the Eastern Shore. Parish criticized the government for “hiring out by
force all the free colored people o f this District, including all who were bom free.”
He claimed that planter reluctance to hire entire families resulted in “parents being
forced to hire out sons and daughters,” and asserted that Shore freedpeople were now
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“in worse bondage than slaves ever were.” Other documents indicate that army
officials did in fact undermine the black family structure by encouraging planters to
hire only those individual freedpeople who could provide immediate agricultural or
domestic labor.
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Freedpeople who could afford to rent land and thus achieve some semblance
o f independence found this alternative closed off by Shore planters. Bureau
investigators found that whites “refuse to rent on such terms and in some cases have
offered exorbitant rents to be paid in cash,” an unreasonable demand that forced
freedpeople “to hire out their labor to the best employer.” Thus, the contract labor
program implemented on the Shore (like Nathaniel Banks’s labor system in
Louisiana) foreshadowed the tragic economic marginalization o f Southern blacks that
would define the Reconstruction years. Federal officials were unwilling to alienate a
population o f “loyal” whites by confiscating abandoned land or actively monitoring
Shore labor relations to ensure that freedmen were treated equitably. The results were
predictable; Shore planters used to contract system to closely replicate antebellum
slavery and forced freedpeople into positions of economic dependence by refusing to
rent or sell land at fair prices. In fact, the writings and rationalizations o f some
government officials suggest that many o f them envisioned an economy in which
freedpeople were permanent agricultural laborers— hardly a philosophy that could or
should be labeled “free labor ideology.”118
Despite the initial admonitions of Freedmen’s Bureau officials, available
evidence suggests that Bureau representatives on the Shore simply continued the
labor policies o f their wartime predecessors. Though Bureau officials promised to
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“watch closely all the contracts that are made” and “annul those which are unjust,”
they reminded freedpeople that the Bureau “has but an advisory role relative to
contracts” and reiterated their primary desire “to urge the freedmen to have a
definitive agreement with employers or landlords.” Bureau representatives admitted
that several cases “have been brought before [Bureau courts] principally on account
o f non-payment o f wages,” but assured freedpeople in March 1866 that such
injustices would be easily rectified in Bureau courts. Unfortunately, the Bureau
closed all of its Shore courts in May 1866, declaring that “all cases, civil and
criminal, in this district will hereafter be tried by state courts”— thus guaranteeing
that pl anters would continue to exploit black employees without fear o f legal
consequences. As briefly noted above, the Bureau also continued wartime reductions
in the level o f government philanthropy and rations provided to Shore freedpeople.119
By m id-1866, a local Bureau official blindly affirmed that Shore freedpeople
lived “in excellent conditions,” a claim that was apparently based on the fact that “all
who are able to work are in some lucrative employment.” Contemporary evidence
suggests otherwise, and the same Bureau official conceded that “many former slavemasters will hire no black man on his farms, nor will they rent them one foot of
ground to cultivate.” Perhaps most telling, the same bureaucrat happily recorded that
the “feeling o f whites here toward the Bureau is friendly, the whites believing its
object to be justice.”120
Meanwhile, as they did at Arlington and elsewhere, Shore freedpeople
actively resisted government policy and planter exploitation, and, in doing so,
articulated their own version of freedom. Like their counterparts at Arlington, Shore
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freedpeople sought financial independence and stability through land ownership.
Surprised Bureau officials “discovered several places on abandoned land where
Negroes have built houses and are cultivating a few areas of land.” Bureau agents
either disbanded such settlements or forced their residents to lease or rent the land
directly from the federal government.

i j I

When land ownership was impossible, freedpeople with some means usually
sought to rent or lease land from local whites or federal officials. Though most Shore
planters feared even this degree o f black independence, some freedpeople were able
to obtain land by these methods. One local Bureau agent informed his superior in
Washington that “many colored persons to whom abandoned land has, been leased are
exceedingly anxious to ascertain whether the same will be available for the ensuing
year, in order that they might make arrangements in preparing their fields for another
crop.” Thus, black lessees tried to stake a permanent or at least long-term claim to
abandoned Shore land.

1'j 'j

Other freedpeople simply refused to participate in the contract labor system.
In early 1865, Col. Frank White complained bitterly about freedman Griffin Collins,
“a leader o f that small class o f colored persons who have since their emancipation,
refused to labor for a livelihood, and who have maintained themselves principally by
theft.” Collins and the rest of these allegedly unruly freedmen “stirred up publicly as
much opposition as possible among the colored people, advising them to refuse to
obey!” Perhaps most revealingly, Collins himself was able to rent a sizable farm on
which he “employed only freedmen who refused to obey [government] orders.” By
renting land and employing other angry freedmen, Collins and his friends
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successfully avoided the financial dependence and exploitation that were endemic to
the Shore’s contract labor system.

1

By late 1866, freedpeople who could not afford to rent or lease land found
another alternative to the federally imposed contract labor system. In January 1867,
Bureau officials and local planters complained that “many o f the freedmen declined
entry into new employments for the present year.” Bureau workers learned that
freedpeople “preferred instead to rent small pieces and tracts o f land and cultivate
them for part o f the crop therein, rather than hire themselves out. They have the
erroneous idea that if they hire themselves out, they are no longer their own masters.”
As many scholars have argued, sharecropping thus seems to have emerged as part of
a compromise between freedpeople who wanted some degree o f control over the
labor process (to be “their own masters”) and local planters who needed steady labor
but could not or would not rent or lease their land to freedmen on a cash basis. The
system initially offered freedpeople a degree o f independence and control that was
unattainable within the Shore’s contract labor system.124
Some Shore freedpeople also acquired or already possessed lucrative artisanal
skills that they could use to steer clear o f contract labor. While artisans at
Freedmen’s Village were not permitted to sell their products on the open market,
army officials on the Shore proclaimed in January 1865 that “skilled artisans will be
permitted to work at such times and places as they may.” Officials noted the
proliferation o f “blacksmiths, carpenters, and shoemakers,” and remarked that “many
[freedpeople] take up oystering” during appropriate seasons.125
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Like freedpeople throughout the South, Shore freedpeople also achieved social
stability by building strong community institutions. Local blacks turned abandoned
or seldom-used churches into active places o f worship, and constructed well-attended
schools throughout the Shore. One local Bureau official informed Bureau
headquarters that “the school referred to is entirely the enterprise o f the Negroes.
They hired Miss Margaret Strong to teach them, a lady eminently qualified for the
position.” He concluded his letter by reiterating that he “had nothing to do with the
establishment o f this school and will not interfere in this matter.”
Elsewhere along the Shore, officials admired a “new school built by blacks”
and organized by a local (black) minister who promised that freedpeople would
“graciously supply all the labor” necessary for a functional school. By all accounts,
attendance at black schools was “very large,” and students o f all ages exhibited “a
great desire and ability to learn.” Freedpeople in Accomac petitioned the Freedmen’s
Bureau, requesting the necessary funds to hire two teachers. In their petition, they
reminded the Bureau that “we have after two years hard labor succeeded in building
two small churches which are to be used as schoolhouses every day.”

1OA

By renting land, sharecropping,-working as artisans, and building strong
community institutions, Shore freedpeople were effectively creating their own
alternative vision o f freedom. While some government officials and local planters
envisioned an agricultural economy with freedmen permanently relegated to positions
as dependent laborers, Shore freedmen sought financial independence and land
ownership that would ultimately lead to upward mobility.
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These efforts combined to produce an intense wave of post-war racial
violence on the Eastern Shore, a well-organized reign of terror that was able to thrive
within a climate o f federal non-intervention. Instances o f racially motivated violence
did occur sporadically throughout the war itself; government officials worried about
"raids and rumors o f raids" from Shore rebels, and local whites burned down a few
black schools and churches. In the spring and summer o f 1866, however, small-scale
localized violence gave way to widespread terror.127
The change began in June o f 1866, when freedman Charles Cranch allegedly
tried to kill a local white storekeeper, one Mr. Bird. According to available records,
Cranch attempted to rob Bird's store. When spied by the storekeeper, Cranch
responded by "cutting [Bird's] throat" and quickly escaped before eventually being
caught and hanged by vigilantes. Over the next six months, incensed local whites
began a series o f "indiscriminate attacks upon freedmen." A group estimated as
numbering over 300 men formed "Simon Brown's Company," a band o f exConfederates and wartime blockade-runners who utilized Klan-style methods of
violence to terrorize local blacks. One Freedmen’s Bureau official described the
l y p i C a i k tiic iCK

In v i v i u u c ia .ii.

[Simon Brown's Company] went to all colored people's houses and finding
firearms and ammunition in them, they took all they could find, and then
organizing themselves into squads, they went to colored people's homes and
demanded admittance, saying they wanted Cranch and if the doors were not
thrown open, they would crush them in, which they did in many cases. After
getting into the houses they would commence looking for firearms and
money, or whatever valuables they could get hold of.128
The attacks were consistently described as "unprovoked" and were often
horrific. Official records and available trial transcripts mention several fatal
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shootings, and one claims that Brown's Company sometimes forced freedpeople to
vacate the Shore entirely. Those who were bold enough to resist such orders were
most commonly "shot and cruelly beaten." A similar pattern was repeated
consistently: angry whites, often with "their faces blacked" and sometimes going
about "in daylight without any disguise," entered the homes o f freedpeople and stole
firearms, valuables, "hairbrushes and combs," and any other available symbols of
black economic gain. One Bureau argued that the entire wave o f violence was caused
by "the presence o f many colored soldiers who upon being mustered out o f service
retained their arm s.. .Almost every freedman has an old gun or pistol he relies on for
protection or hunting.. .[The Company] is focused on disarming returned colored
soldiers." Another Bureau investigator claimed that Brown's Company v/as
disproportionately comprised o f "a class of poor whites whose hatred arises from the
fear that some freedmen will outstrip them in bettering their conditions. They believe
that the nigger has not even the right to live."
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This pattern o f postwar violence on the Shore resembled the racial attacks that
plagued other Southern states during the same years. Several scholars have noted the
tendency among whites to attack symbols of black progress and domestic stability.
Whites destroyed community institutions and emasculated black patriarchs by
invading their private sphere (the home) and removing all representations o f black
strength (firearms) and economic progress (valuables and the houses themselves).

1 "J A

Federal authorities rarely intervened to quash racial violence on the Shore.
The same federal officials who haphazardly funneled freedpeople into private
contract labor relied exclusively on ineffective local courts to curtail white violence.
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Officials initially sent federal troops from Fort Monroe to quell the disturbances
during the summer o f 1866. The troops actually arrested four members o f Brown's
Company linked directly to the hanging of Charles Cranch, but allowed local courts
to handle the case despite repeated warnings that "if [the suspects] are tried in a civil
court, they will not be convicted. . .It would be impossible to get a jury to convict a
white man on the evidence o f a colored man." The trial proved to be a farce.
Members o f Brown's Company threatened to "kill the first black man" who provided
evidence "on the spot," while the all-white jury refused to allow local blacks to testify
and prohibited the use o f "colored evidence" entirely. All of the accused were
quickly acquitted, despite the fact that "their names and deeds are widely known."
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Throughout 1866 and 1867, federal officials allowed fearful and/or racist local
authorities to deal with race-related crimes on the Shore. According to one angry
Bureau investigator, the seemingly ceaseless attacks on local freedpeople were "in
part due to the meekness and incapacity o f local officials who are weak vacillating
men possessing no moral courage and who are totally unable to preserve the peace or
awe the violators." Various interviews with local justices o f the peace validate this
rather harsh condemnation of local authorities. Justice George Pew "was intimidated"
by local vigilantes and refused to issue arrest warrants because his "neighbors were
aroused and excited" by the anti-black fervor that swept the Shore. Likewise, Justice
o f the Peace William Dix advised a local officer hostile to Brown's Company that "he
better leave the matter alone or his life might be taken," while Dix admitted that his
own silence and inaction were due to his fear o f "getting into trouble" with local
whites. Bureau investigators sympathetic with the freedpeople’s cause angrily
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reported that "local justices refuse to issue warrants in fear of their own safety," and
another anti-Brown official stationed on the Shore was so afraid o f violent reprisals
that he wanted his name removed from all government documents related to Shore
violence.
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Once again, the admirable exposes and angry reports o f a few isolated Bureau
officers could not overcome the overall conservatism of the Bureau and the federal
government as a whole. Bureau officials on the Shore and their counterparts in
Washington continued to rely on local courts, even though it was obvious that the
muscle o f the Shore legal system was arrayed against freedpeople. Justice o f the
Peace George Pew claimed that "all the constables in the county are strong
sympathizers with the rioters," while Bureau investigators again and again
complained that local constables and sheriffs "do not seek knowledge o f the crimes
committed but rather avoid such information and would rather let the offenders go
untouched by justice." Indeed, some evidence indicates that Brown's Company
essentially became the law; white citizens including shopkeeper Bird offered
members o f Brown's Company financial rewards in exchange for the capture and
lynching o f local freedpeople. At the very least, local constables "remained silent"
and "avoided trying to prevent" violence against freedpeople. The attacks on blacks
abated only in the latter part o f 1867.133
Scholars should be careful, though, in conflating government inaction in the
face o f violence with the federal policy o f favoring contract labor. While federal
officials openly expressed a desire to leave freedpeople to fend for themselves within
the competitive (and racist) labor market, the same bureaucrats seldom argued
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(directly and openly, at least) that violence against Shore freedpeople was a
temporary problem with an automatic, local solution. In other words, while some
federal officials openly and maliciously encouraged the economic marginalization of
Shore freedpeople, their reactions to racial violence were simultaneously non
interventionist and sympathetic. Despite this important distinction, the reluctance of
federal officials who opposed federal intervention on principal alone or who feared
alienating a nominally "loyal" population, led to financial and personal disaster for
many Shore freedpeople.

Many scholars have used the concept of “free labor ideology” to explain the
failure o f Reconstruction in the South. That mid-nineteenth century Republican ideal
can be roughly defined as the belief that a “free labor economy” was more efficient
and productive than a slave-based economy. “Free labor” Republicans also believed
that freedpeople— if given a free and fair chance to compete in the capitalist
economy—would ultimately succeed, since a true free labor economy rewarded hard
work above all else.
Since the early 1980s, historians (most notably Eric Foner) have found fault
with this ideology. They have argued quite convincingly that many “free labor”
Republicans held an unrealistic faith in the free market, one that led them to favor a
limited and temporary federal role in the Reconstruction of the South. Once slavery
was destroyed, these pundits claimed, the federal government could leave freedpeople
to fend for themselves in the new competitive economy. Widespread charity, land
redistribution, or other costly plans were therefore unnecessary.
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While this argument remains a persuasive way to explain the rise o f Liberal
Republicanism and the general Republican (and Northern) reluctance to aid Southern
freedpeople in the early 1870s, it cannot alone account for the shortcomings of
military and Bureau policy on the ground level during the war and the early postwar
years. In both Freedmen’s Village and Virginia’s Eastern Shore, military and (later)
Bureau officials never came close to applying a true free labor philosophy. Though
isolated voices o f protest emerged within the government (especially the Bureau),
federal policy exploited freedpeople during the war and forced freedpeople into slave
like positions as dependent agricultural laborers after the war.
Indeed, the overriding goal o f federal policy was to eliminate the potential
public “burden” the freedpeople represented and stabilize the postwar Southern
economy by placing freedpeople in the inferior positions where they “belonged” in
the eyes o f many officials. Contract labor under private planters represented the most
efficient way to accomplish these goals, and the military and the Bureau both chose
this solution whenever it was possible in both Arlington and the Eastern Shore.
Though contract labor paid wages and technically placed freedpeople within
the larger competitive economy, it was in no way “free labor”; military and Bureau
officials simply forced freedpeople to sign contracts, giving them little or no role in
choosing the terms o f their economic future. Other options— industrial labor,
artisanal work, migration to the North, and (most radical of all) land redistribution—
were eliminated by the federal emphasis on contract labor. Most damning of all,
many military and Bureau officials openly justified this policy with racist rhetoric
about the “rightful place” of freedpeople as subordinate farm workers. Radical talk

about a potential “revolution in race relations” was meaningless when the military
and Bureau officials on the local level—the men who really made federal policy—
were determined to prevent that revolution from happening.
Finally, when factors like the lack of an accessible local planter class in
Arlington made contract labor impossible, the federal military simply decided to
temporarily exploit contrabands for its own purposes. Until overcrowding
necessitated a change in Village policy, military officials at Freedman’s Village
impressed able contrabands and transformed the remaining freedpeople into a mass of
underpaid (indeed, virtually unpaid) government workers with no mobility and no
control over Village land or the products o f their labor. Though the grounds o f
Arlington looked green and scenic in comparison to the crowded streets of nearby
Washington, the Village remained (in essence) a forced labor camp.
In short, historians can find the roots o f Reconstruction’s failure in the
wartime and immediate postwar government policies in Arlington and Virginia’s
Eastern Shore. The freedpeople— despite their efforts and demands for
independence— could not overcome the racism of local planters and the conservatism
of the federal officials who would play a crucial role in determining their immediate
economic future. When one considers wartime and early Reconstruction, it becomes
readily understandable that many freedpeople across the South ultimately concluded
that “The Yankees helped free us, so they say, but they let us be put back in slavery
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o f Louisiana, the Midwest, and Virginia's Eastern Shore, see appropriate books and articles by Susie
Ames, Lawanda Cox, C. Peter Ripley, V. Jacque Voegeli, Louis Gerteis, John Eaton, Peyton McCrary,
Mary F. Berry, Martha Bigelow, all cited above. Each o f these locations featured a very large nearby
class o f local planters, which led to the development o f (often) harsh and oppressive contract labor
systems, most famously in Louisiana under General Nathaniel Banks. Since Arlington and many
surrounding towns were largely abandoned once the war began, Village contrabands (partially)
escaped this fate.
46 See E. H. Ludington and C. E. Compton to James A. Hardie, July 30 1864, RG 159, NA.
Ludington and Compton investigated the camp in July. This seven-page letter represents their
findings. See also Benjamin F. Taylor, Mission Ridge and Lookout Mountain, With Pictures o f Life in
Camp and Field. (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1872), pp. 68-70. Taylor briefly visited
the Village and saw the contrabands digging the graves o f Arlington cemetery throughout his visit.
47 For details on impressment at Freedmen's Village, see Testimony o f Lieut. Charles Shepard
January 1864, RG 393 and testimony o f Danforth B. Nichols, January 1864, RG 393, NA.
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48 See J. M. Brown to Mr. G. G. Beisley, December 10 1864, RG 105, NA.
49 Testimony o f Lewis Johnson, January 1864, RG 393, NA.
50 For evidence o f forced labor among women and children see above testimony and M.
Meigs to E. Stanton August 15 1864, RG 92, NA. For mobility regulations, see K. Knox to J. Hardie
October 19 1864, RG 159, NA. Interestingly, freedmen were also prohibited from buying alcohol
from a "sutler's establishment" on the premises. See J. M. Brown to George Carse November 4 1864,
RG 105, NA.
51 Testimony o f Betsy Brown, January 1864, RG 393, NA. Also cited in Reidy, "Freedmen's
Village," p. 413.
52 J. M. Brown to George Carse, December 3 1864, RG 105, NA.
53 For information on the Lucy Johnson case, see testimony o f Louisa Barker, January 14
1864, RG 393, NA.
54 For further information on the Henry Cook case, see testimony o f Henry Cook and
Danforth Nichols, January 1864, RG 393, NA.
55 See Lewis Johnson testimony, cited in noted 49.
56 For several vivid descriptions o f the Camp Barker removal and that o f other Washington
settlements, see D. B. Nichols to E. Greene, January 23 1864, RG 92, NA; Greene to Col. J. H. Taylor
January 30 1863, RG 92, NA; H. E. Simmons to Greene January 23 1864, RG 92, NA; E.H. Holmes to
E. Greene January 23 1864, RG 92, NA; W. A. Benedict to Greene January 23 1864, RG 92, NA; M.
C. Perry to Greene January 22 1864, RG 92, NA.
57 See for instance J. M. Brown to M. Meigs, December 9 1864, RG 92, NA; C. Dana to
James Ferree and William Slade January 10 1865, RG 92, NA; C. W. Foster to E. H. Day, December 7
1864, RG 92, NA.
58 On the initial condition o f incoming villagers and the spread o f new diseases, see D. 3 .
Nichols to E. M. Greene, January 23, 1864; H. E. Simmons to Greene January 23 1864; Greene to Col.
Charles Thomas January 23 1864, all filed in RG 92, NA.
59 On physical conditions and mobility restrictions on Mason's Island, see Ludington and
Compton to Col. J. Hardie July 30 1864, RG 159, NA; R. Raybum to J. Eaton, September 8 1865, RG
92, NA; K. Knox to J. Hardie October 13 1864, RG 159, NA; Knox to Hardie October 19 1864.
60 For copies o f labor and apprenticeship contracts, see General Contracts authored by Elias
Greene, 1864, filed in RG 159, NA. For a government evaluation o f hiring on Mason's Island, see K.
Knox to J. Hardie, October 13 1864, RG 159, NA and Knox to Hardie October 19 1864, RG 159, NA.
61 Statistics cited in Berlin, et al, Wartime Genesis o f Free Labor, p. 261.
62 For lists o f employment locations, see "Register o f Freedmen Departing from Mason's
Island, 1864-1865," filed in RG 105, NA. For complaints o f "bound out" Mason's Island freedmen, see
testimony o f Samuel Brown, September 1865, RG 105, NA and Carter Holmes to Col. Wm. Beebe
April 22 1867, RG 105, NA.

75

[Notes to pages 29-34]
63 For black resistance to the contract labor system, see Berlin, et al, Wartime Genesis o f Free
Labor, 260-261; Knox to Hardie, October 19 1864, RG 159, NA; Greene to J. H. Taylor, January 30
1863, RG 92, NA.
64 The only article devoted to education at the Village is Roberta Schildt, "Aladdin's Lamp:
Education in Freedmen's Village," Arlington H istorical Magazine, Volume 10 (3),(1995), pp. 7-18. It
focuses on the school conditions and the high attendance rate rather than analyzing curriculum. For
the views o f Village officials on Village education, see J. M. Brown to George B. Carse, February 11
1865, RG 105, NA and E. Greene to J. H. Taylor, January 30 1863, RG 92, NA.
65 See appropriate books and articles on Midwest and Sea Island cited above, especially Rose,
Rehearsal, which has great descriptions o f debates between missionaries and military officials.
66 Quote taken directly from the "American Tract Society Constitution," cited in Edwin
Gaustad, ed, American Tract Society Documents: 1824-1925 (New York: A m o Press, 1972), p. 6 and
Clarence Griffin, Their Brothers'Keepers (New Bmnswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1960), p.
192.
67 "Duties o f Masters" is included in Seth Bliss, Letters to the Members, Patrons, and Friends
o f the Branch o f the American Tract Society in Boston (Boston, Crocker and Brewster, 1858), quote
taken from p. 136.
68 For reaction to "Duties" see Griffin, pp. 192-197.
69 For details o f the split, see Bliss, pp. 1-140. This source is a collection o f contentious
letters and speeches regarding the issue. The most openly abolitionist speech in the collection was
given by W illiam Wilberforce and entitled "The Enormity o f the Slave Trade and the Duty o f Seeking
the Moral and Spiritual Elevation o f the Colored Race." (Boston: American Tract Society, specific
date o f publishing unknown—probably 1858).
70 Isaac Brinckerhoff, Advice to Freedmen (New York: AMS Press, 1980), pp. 18-19.
71 See Brinckerhoff, pp. 15-25; Jared Waterbury, Friendly Counsels fo r Freedmen (New
York: AM S Press, 1980); Helen Brown, John Freeman and His Family (N ew York: AMS Press,
1980); Clinton Fisk, Plain Counsels fo r Freedmen (New York: AMS Press, 1980).
72 See American Tract Society, The Freedman's Spelling Book (New York: AMS Press,
1980). American Tract Society, The Freedmen's Second Reader (New York: AMS Press, 1980).
American Tract Society, The Freedmen's Third Reader (New York: AMS Press, 1980).
73 See the nearly identical monthly or weekly (the periods for each varied) issues o f The
Freedman (1864-1869) and The Freedman's Journal, 1865-1866.
74 Quotes taken from Carlton Mabee, Sojourner Truth (New York: N ew York University
Press, 1993), pp. 120-122, and Erlene Stetson and Linda David, Glorying in Tribulation: The
Lifework o f Sojourner Truth (East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 1994), pp.
146-150.
75 Quotes taken from Fisk, 47, The Freedman, January 1864, and The Freedman's Journal,
January 1865.
76 Waterbury 5-7.
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77 For an overview o f the more liberal AMA see Clara Deboer, His Soul is Marching On:
African Americans Who Taught the Freedmen fo r the American Missionary Association (New York:
Garland Publishing, 1995), and Griffin, pp. 190-200. For an overview o f Northern missionary
associations in general, see Charles Cole, The Social Ideas o f the Northern Evangelicals (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1954). Though Cole focuses mostly on famous abolitionist fire-eaters who
fomented sectional tension, his work does examine the slavery and race-related divisions within the
religious community. Quotes about education taken from NFRA publications: The National
Freedman, February 1865 and June 1866; The Freedman's Advocate October 1864 and August 1864.
78 For complaints about contraband marriage practices see W. F. Spurgan to S. N. Clark,
November 20 1865, RG 105, NA. For the general historiographical debate surrounding freedmen
education, see the following monographs: James Anderson, The Education o f Blacks in the South:
1860-1935 (London: University o f North Carolina Press, 1988); Henry Swint, The Northern Teacher
in the South: 1862-1870 (New York: Octagon Books, 1967); Robert Morris, Reading, 'Riting, and
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traditional classroom strategies that did not work well with freedmen. For information on attendance
at the Village school, see Schildt, "Aladdin's Lamp."
79 For evidence o f the intensification in Village policy, see Benjamin Wade to O. C. Howard,
April 3 1867, RG 105, NA; Dangerfield Beverly to Andrew Johnson, September 27 1865; testimony of
Lieut. Lomas, September 1865; testimony o f Liley Bailey, September 1865; W. W. Rogers to A. A.
Lawrence August 18 1866; S. N. Clark to W. W. Rogers December 29 1866; Clark to Lawrence
November 2 1866; Lawrence to O. C. Howard, Febmary 18, 1867; Clark to Burgevin, March 7 1866;
J. M. Brown to F. B. Median June 12 1865, all filed in RG 105, NA.
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Lawrence to C. H. Howard October 31 1866; S. N. Clark to C. H. Howard December 31 1866; Clark to
Howard, May 31 1866; J. H. McBlair to Howard, May 9 1866; R. Rayburn to Col. J. Eaton September
8 1865, all filed in RG 105, NA.
81 Clark to Burgevin, March 7 1866, RG 105, NA.
82 For data on hirings, see "Register o f Freedmen Departing Mason's Island," RG 105, NA.
83 Testimony o f James Graw, April 1866, RG 105, NA.
84 Testimony o f Joseph Hall on behalf o f Rindy Allen, September 1865, RG 105, NA
85 Carter Holmes to Lieut. Col. Wm. Beebe, April 22 1867, cited in Berlin, et al. The Wartime
Genesis o f Free Labor, p. 346.
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86 For data on Village contrabands sent to Arkansas, see S. P. Lee to C. H. Howard, January
22 1867 and H. Sweeney to Col. H. Page, both filed in RG 105, NA, and also cited in Reidy,
"Freedmen's Village," p. 416.
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3 1867; Dangerfield Beverly to Andrew Johnson and accompanying testimony, September 27, 1865;
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105, NA.
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January 7, 1867; Laws, et al to Howard, December 1866; Peterson to Howard, December 26 1866;
Laws, Wormley, Robinson, et al to
, January 1 1867; Laws to Howard, January 14, 1867, all
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89 For details on leaseholders, see A. A. Lawrence to C. H. Howard October 31 1866, RG
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outside the Village, see W. W. Rogers to S. P. Lee, November 27 1866, RG 105, NA and Reidy,
"Freedmen's Village," pp. 419-420.
90 See W. F. Spurgon to S. N. Clark, November 20 1865, RG 105, NA.
91 See R. Laws to C. H. Howard, December 31 1866, RG 105, NA; Stetson and David, pp.
148-150; Mabee, pp. 148-152; Laws to J. W. Vandenburgh, November 15 1866, RG 105, NA;
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see Saville, The Work o f Reconstruction, Ransom and Sutch, One Kind o f Freedom, Willie Lee Rose,
Rehearsal fo r Reconstruction, Edward Magdol, A Right to the Land, and Laura Edwards, Gendered
Strife and Confusion.
93 For these comments, see S. N. Clark to W. W. Rogers, December 29 1866, RG 105, NA.
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Lawrence to Howard, February 18 1867, C. S. B. Wall to Howard, April 13 1867, Clark to Burgevin,
March 7 1866, and J. M. Brown to H. M. Stinson, May 20, 1865, all filed in RG 105, NA.3
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one that lasted until the end o f the nineteenth century, see James, "Decline," and Reidy, "Freedmen's
Village"; Washington Post, December 7, 1887, and New York Herald, December 7, 1887.
96 Quoted in Ames, "Eastern Shore," p. 440.
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97 Quoted in Ames, pp. 434-5 and John Dix, Memoirs o f John A. Dix (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1883), p. 25 and p. 31.
98 Ames, pp. 438-400, and Dix, pp. 30-35.
99 Ames, pp. 438-400, and Dix, pp. 38-39.
100 Proclamation cited in Ames, "Eastern Shore," pp. 442-3, and Dix, pp. 40-1.
101 For a detailed first-person account o f the Dix expedition, see Alfred Davenport, Camp and
F ield Life o f the Fifth New York Voluntary Regiment (New York: Dick and Fitzgerald, 1879), pp. 125133, and Ames, "Eastern Shore," pp. 444-456.
102 Quote taken from General Henry Lockwood to Col. W. P. Whipple, August 7 1862, RG
107, NA.
103 Major H. Hayman to General Robert Schenck, September 16 1863 and General V. Massey
to Captain R. F. Duvall, November 21 1863, both filed in RG 393, NA. See also C. S. Henry to Col.
Kinsman January 10 1864 and Henry to Kinsman March 23 1864, both filed in RG 105, NA.
104 See Henry to Kinsman, Febmary 29 1864 and Henry to Kinsman, January 10 1864, both
filed in RG 105, NA.
105 See Hayman to Schenck, September 16, 1863 and Massey to Duvall, November 21 1863,
both filed in RG 393, NA. See also "Special Order #76 from the Provost Marshall on the Eastern
Shore o f Virginia," October 24 1864, RG 393, NA.
106 See Hayman to Schenck, Henry to Kinsman, January 10 1864, and Henry to Kinsman,
March 30, 1864, RG 105, NA.
107 See Henry to Kinsman, Febmary 29 1864, and "Circular from the Office o f Provost
Marshall for Accomack and Northampton Counties," Febmary 12 1864, RG 393, NA.
108 See "Special Order #76 from the Provost Marshall o f the Eastern Shore o f Virginia,"
October 24 1864, (unnumbered) "Special Order from the Provost Marshall o f Virginia," November 4
1864, Lt. Colonel and Provost Marshall Frank J. White to Thomas R. Joynes, November 1 1864, and
White to Edward Ord, Febmary 6 1865, all filed in RG 393, NA.
109 See above documents for an overview on the new Shore labor policy. Quotes taken
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1,0 See White to Captain Mahon, November 11 1864, RG 393, NA, Mahon to Natson (?),
December 23 1864, RG 393, NA and above documents. Quotes taken from White to Mahon and
Mahon to Natson.
111 See (unnumbered) "Special Order," White to Joynes, and White to Ord. Quotes taken from
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112 See above documents. Quotes taken from White to Ord, Febmary 6 1865.
113 See White to Ord, White to G. C. Taylor, Febmary 11 1865, and "Special Order #74 from
the Provost Marshall o f the Eastern Shore o f Virginia," October 22 1864, all filed in RG 393, NA.
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the Provost Marshall o f the Eastern Shore o f Virginia," January 1865, RG 393, NA.
118 See Ed, Murphy to O. Brown, January 31 1867, RG 105, NA, and White to Ord, Febmary
6 1865.
119 For Bureau policy on the Eastern Shore, see especially "Circular #13," April 4 1866,
"General Order #5," May 4 1 866,
to O. Brown, January 3 1866, and O. S. Pride to O. Brown,
March 5 1866, all filed in RG 105, NA. For an overview o f federal charity and benevolence under the
wartime administration and the Bureau, see the following documents: C. S. Henry to Col. Kinsman,
March 30 1864, RG 105, NA, White to Ord, Febmary 6 1865, RG 393, NA, White to Stem, November
2 1864, RG 393, NA, White to G. C. Taylor, Febmary 1 1865, RG 393, NA, "Special Order #74 from
the Provost Marshall o f the Eastern Shore o f Virginia," October 22 1864, RG 393, NA, "Circular Order
from the Provost Marshall o f the Eastern Shore o f Virginia," December 23 1864, RG 393, NA, White
to T. Elliot, January 31 1865, RG 393, NA, White to T. Elliot Febmary 11 1865, RG 393, NA, White
to Col. Small, Febmary 14 1865, RG 393, NA, Stuart Bames to O. Brown, June 21 1865, RG 105, NA,
William P. Londte to A. S. Flagg, September 4 1865, RG 105, NA, "General Order #2," March 6
1866, RG 105, NA, and "General Order #3," March 19 1866, RG 105, NA.
120 See O. S. Pride to O. Brown, March 5 1866, RG 105, NA.
121 See J. Lord to A. S. Flagg, September 1 1865, RG 105, NA.
122 See William Londte to A. S. Flagg, September 4 1865, RG 105, NA.
123 See "Circular #14," April 4 1866, RG 105, NA.
124 See Ed. Murphy to O. Brown, January 1 1867, RG 105, NA. For general discussions and
debates regarding the forces behind the development o f sharecropping, see the following: Jonathan
Wiener and Harold Woodman. "American H istorical Review Fomm: Class Structure and Economic
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RG 393, NA, and Murphy to Brown.
126 See H. O. Sidney to A. S. Flagg, July 10 1865, RG 105, NA, William Londte to Flagg,
September 4 1865, RG 105, NA, John H. Offner ("on behalf o f the people") to Major G. P. Sherwood,
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to O. Brown, April 1 1866, RG 105, NA.
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Kinsman, March 23 1864, RG 105, NA, General V. Massey to Captain R. F. Duvall, November 21
1863, RG 393, NA, and "Special Order #70 from the Provost Marshall o f the Eastern Shore o f
Virginia," October 15 1864, RG 393, NA.
128 See General A. H. Henry to Brig. Gen. S F. Bamstein, August 5 1866, RG 393, NA, M.
French to S. C. Armstrong, July 25 1866, RG 105, NA, and testimony o f Major General A. H. Terry,
August 9 1866, RG 105, NA. Long quote taken from French to Armstrong.
129 See French to James A. Bates, July 30 1866, RG 105, NA, T. H. Evans to French, July 27
1866, RG 105, NA, "Complaints o f Freedmen James Seymor," June 30 1866, RG 105, NA, Nelson A.
Miles to Fort Monroe, July 30, 1866, RG 105, NA, Ed. Murphy to O. Brown, October 31 1866, RG
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Confusion, and Hayden, "An Incident o f Outrage."
131 See French to Armstrong, July 25 1866, RG 105, NA, French to Bates, July 30 1866, RG
105, NA, General A. H. Terry to Brig. General S. F. Bamstein, August 5 1866, RG 105, NA, and
Testimony o f General A. H. Terry, recorded August 9 1866, RG 105, NA.
132 For evidence o f local law enforcement problems and official reluctance, see Ed. Murphy to
O. Brown, January 30, 1866, RG 105, NA, testimony o f George Pew, recorded August 9 1866, RG
105, NA, testimony o f William Dix, recorded August 9 1866, RG 105, NA, French to Armstrong, July
25, 1866, RG 105, NA, and T. H. Evans to French, July 27 1866, RG 105, NA.
133 See French to Bates, July 30, 1866, RG 105, NA, testimony o f General A. H. Terry,
recorded August 9 1866, RG 105, NA, Ed. Murphy to O. Brown January 30 1866, RG 105, NA,
French to Armstrong, July 25 1866, RG 105, NA, testimony o f William Dix, recorded August 9 1866,
RG 105, NA, Ed. Murphy to S. C. Armstrong, November 26 1866, RG 105, NA, and General
Sherwood to Lt. E. W. Stone, November 27 1867, RG 105, NA.
134 Quote taken from Foner, 610. For general "revisionist" narrative o f Reconstruction, see Les
Benedict, A Compromise o f Principle, which focuses mostly on Reconstruction during the Johnson
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